Our last post highlighted one of the amicus briefs filed in the Hachette v. Internet Archive lawsuit, which made the point that controlled digital lending serves important privacy interests for library readers. Today I want to highlight a second new issue introduced on appeal and addressed by almost every amici: the proper way to assess whether a given use is “non-commercial.”
“Non-commercial” use is important because the first fair use factor directs courts to assess “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.” Before the district court, neither Internet Archive (IA) nor amici who filed in support of IA paid considerable attention to arguing about whether IA’s use was commercial, I think because it seemed so clear that lending books for free to library patrons appeared to us a paradigmatic example of non-commercial use. It came as a shock, therefore, when the District Court in this case concluded that “IA stands to profit” from its use and that the use was therefore commercial.
The Court’s reasoning was odd. While it recognized that IA “is a non-profit organization that does not charge patrons to borrow books and because private reading is noncommercial in nature,” the court concluded that because IA gains “an advantage or benefit from its distribution and use” of the works at issue, its use was commercial. Among the “benefits” that the court listed:
IA exploits the Works in Suit without paying the customary price
IA uses its Website to attract new members, solicit donations, and bolster its standing in the library community.
Better World Books also pays IA whenever a patron buys a used book from BWB after clicking on the “Purchase at Better World Books” button that appears on the top of webpages for ebooks on the Website.
Although almost every amici addressed the problems with this approach to “non-commercial” use, three briefs, in particular, added important additional context, explaining both why the district court was wrong on the law and why its rule would have dramatically negative implications for other libraries and nonprofit organizations.
First, the Association of Research Libraries and the American Library Association, represented by Brandon Butler, make a forceful legal argument in their amicus brief about why the district court’s baseline formulation of commerciality (benefit without paying the customary price) was wrong:
The district court’s determination that the Internet Archive (“IA”) was engaged in a “commercial” use for purposes of the first statutory factor is based on a circular argument that seemingly renders every would-be fair use “commercial” so long as the user benefits in some way from their use. This cannot be the law, and in the Second Circuit it is not. The correct standard is clearly stated in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F. 3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), a case the district court ignored entirely.
ARL and ALA then go on to highlight numerous examples of appellate courts (including the Second Circuit) rejecting this approach such as in the 11th Circuit in the Georgia State E-reserves copyright lawsuit: “Of course, any unlicensed use of copyrighted material profits the user in the sense that the user does not pay a potential licensing fee, allowing the user to keep his or her money. If this analysis were persuasive, no use could qualify as ’nonprofit’ under the first factor.”
The constitutional goal of copyright protection is to “promote the progress of science and useful arts,” Art. I, sec. 1, cl. 8, and the first copyright law was “an act for the encouragement of learning,” Cambridge University Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1256 (11th Cir. 2014). This case provides an opportunity for this Court to reaffirm that vision by recognizing the special role that noncommercial, nonprofit uses play in supporting freedom of speech and access to knowledge.
The IP Professors Brief then goes on to highlight the many ways that Congress has indicated that library lending should be treated favorably because it furthers objectives of supporting learning, and how the court’s constrained reading of “non-commercial” is actually in conflict with how that term is used elsewhere in the Copyright Act (for example, Sections 111, 114, and 118 for non-commercial broadcasters, or Section 1008 for non-commercial consumers who copy music). The brief then goes on to make a strong case for why the district court wasn’t only mistaken, but that library lending should presumptively be treated as non-commercial.
Finally, we see the amicus brief from the Wikimedia Foundation, Creative Commons, and Project Gutenberg, represented by Jef Pearlman and a team of students at the USC IP & Technology Law Clinic. Their brief highlighted in detail the practical challenges that the district court’s approach to non-commercial use would pose for all sorts of online nonprofits. The brief explains how nonprofits that raise money will inevitably include donation buttons on pages with fair use content, rely on volunteer contributions, and engage in revenue-generated activities to support their work, which in some cases require millions of dollars for technical infrastructure. The brief explains:
The district court defined “commercial” under the first fair use factor far too broadly, inextricably linking secondary uses to fundraising even when those activities are, in practice, completely unrelated. In evaluating what constitutes commercial use, the district court misapplied several considerations and ignored other critical considerations. As a result, the district court’s ruling threatens nonprofit organizations who make fair use of copyrighted works. Adopting the district court’s approach would threaten both the processes of nonprofit fundraising and the methods by which educational nonprofits provide their services.
This is a guest post by Rachael G. Samberg, Timothy Vollmer, and Samantha Teremi, professionals within the Office of Scholarly Communication Services at UC Berkeley Library.
On academic and library listservs, there has emerged an increasingly fraught discussion about licensing scholarly content when scholars’ research methodologies rely on artificial intelligence (AI). Scholars and librarians are rightfully concerned that non-profit educational research methodologies like text and data mining (TDM) that can (but do not necessarily) incorporate usage of AI tools are being clamped down upon by publishers. Indeed, libraries are now being presented with content license agreements that prohibit AI tools and training entirely, irrespective of scholarly purpose.
Conversely, publishers, vendors, and content creators—a group we’ll call “rightsholders” here—have expressed valid concerns about how their copyright-protected content is used in AI training, particularly in a commercial context unrelated to scholarly research. Rightsholders fear that their livelihoods are being threatened when generative AI tools are trained and then used to create new outputs that they believe could infringe upon or undermine the market for their works.
Within the context of non-profit academic research, rightsholders’ fears about allowing AI training, and especially non-generative AI training, are misplaced. Newly-emerging content license agreements that prohibit usage of AI entirely, or charge exorbitant fees for it as a separately-licensed right, will be devastating for scientific research and the advancement of knowledge. Our aim with this post is to empower scholars and academic librarians with legal information about why those licensing outcomes are unnecessary, and equip them with alternative licensing language to adequately address rightsholders’ concerns.
To that end, we will:
Explain the copyright landscape underpinning the use of AI in research contexts;
Address ways that AI usage can be regulated to protect rightsholders, while outlining opportunities to reform contract law to support scholars; and
Conclude with practical language that can be incorporated into licensing agreements, so that libraries and scholars can continue to achieve licensing outcomes that satisfy research needs.
Our guidance is based on legal analysis as well as our views as law and policy experts working within scholarly communication. While your mileage or opinions may vary, we hope that the explanations and tools we provide offer a springboard for discussion within your academic institutions or communities about ways to approach licensing scholarly content in the age of AI research.
Copyright and AI training
As we have recently explored in presentations and posts, the copyright law and policy landscape underpinning the use of AI models is complex, and regulatory decision-making in the copyright sphere will have ramifications for global enterprise, innovation, and trade. A much-discussed group of lawsuits and a parallel inquiry from the U.S. Copyright Office raise important and timely legal questions, many of which we are only beginning to understand. But there are two precepts that we believe are clear now, and that bear upon the non-profit education, research, and scholarship undertaken by scholars who rely on AI models.
First, as the UC Berkeley Library has explained in greater detail to the Copyright Office, training artificial intelligence is a fair use—and particularly so in a non-profit research and educational context. (For other similar comments provided to the Copyright Office, see, e.g., the submissions of Authors Alliance and Project LEND). Maintaining its continued treatment as fair use is essential to protecting research, including TDM.
TDM refers generally to a set of research methodologies reliant on computational tools, algorithms, and automated techniques to extract revelatory information from large sets of unstructured or thinly-structured digital content. Not all TDM methodologies necessitate usage of AI models in doing so. For instance, the words that 20th century fiction authors use to describe happiness can be searched for in a corpus of works merely by using algorithms looking for synonyms and variations of words like “happiness” or “mirth,” with no AI involved. But to find examples of happy characters in those books, a researcher would likely need to apply what are called discriminative modeling methodologies that first train AI on examples of what qualities a happy character demonstrates or exhibits, so that the AI can then go and search for occurrences within a larger corpus of works. This latter TDM process involves AI, but not generative AI; and scholars have relied non-controversially on this kind of non-generative AI training within TDM for years.
Previous court cases like Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, Authors Guild v. Google, and A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigmshave addressed fair use in the context of TDM and confirmed that the reproduction of copyrighted works to create and conduct text and data mining on a collection of copyright-protected works is a fair use. These cases further hold that making derived data, results, abstractions, metadata, or analysis from the copyright-protected corpus available to the public is also fair use, as long as the research methodologies or data distribution processes do not re-express the underlying works to the public in a way that could supplant the market for the originals.
For the same reasons that the TDM processes constitute fair use of copyrighted works in these contexts, the training of AI tools to do that text and data mining is also fair use. This is in large part because of the same transformativeness of the purpose (under Fair Use Factor 1) and because, just like “regular” TDM that doesn’t involve AI, AI training does not reproduce or communicate the underlying copyrighted works to the public (which is essential to the determination of market supplantation for Fair Use Factor 4).
But, while AI training is no different from other TDM methodologies in terms of fair use, there is an important distinction to make between the inputs for AI training and generative AI’s outputs. The overall fair use of generative AI outputs cannot always be predicted in advance: The mechanics of generative AI models’ operations suggest that there are limited instances in which generative AI outputs could indeed be substantially similar to (and potentially infringing of) the underlying works used for training; this substantial similarity is possible typically only when a training corpus is rife with numerous copies of the same work. And a recent case filed by the New York Times addresses this potential similarity problem with generative AI outputs.
Yet, training inputs should not be conflated with outputs: The training of AI models by using copyright-protected inputs falls squarely within what courts have already determined in TDM cases to be a transformative fair use. This is especially true when that AI training is conducted for non-profit educational or research purposes, as this bolsters its status under Fair Use Factor 1, which considers both transformativeness and whether the act is undertaken for non-profit educational purposes.
Were a court to suddenly determine that training AI was not fair use, and AI training was subsequently permitted only on “safe” materials (like public domain works or works for which training permission has been granted via license), this would curtail freedom of inquiry, exacerbate bias in the nature of research questions able to be studied and the methodologies available to study them, and amplify the views of an unrepresentative set of creators given the limited types of materials available with which to conduct the studies.
The second precept we uphold is that scholars’ ability to access the underlying content to conduct fair use AI training should be preserved with no opt-outs from the perspective of copyright regulation.
The fair use provision of the Copyright Act does not afford copyright owners a right to opt out of allowing other people to use their works in any other circumstance, for good reason: If content creators were able to opt out of fair use, little content would be available freely to build upon. Uniquely allowing fair use opt-outs only in the context of AI training would be a particular threat for research and education, because fair use in these contexts is already becoming an out-of-reach luxury even for the wealthiest institutions. What do we mean?
In the U.S., the prospect of “contractual override” means that, although fair use is statutorily provided for, private parties like publishers may “contract around” fair use by requiring libraries to negotiate for otherwise lawful activities (such as conducting TDM or training AI for research). Academic libraries are forced to pay significant sums each year to try to preserve fair use rights for campus scholars through the database and electronic content license agreements that they sign. This override landscape is particularly detrimental for TDM research methodologies, because TDM research often requires use of massive datasets with works from many publishers, including copyright owners who cannot be identified or who are unwilling to grant such licenses.
So, if the Copyright Office or Congress were to enable rightsholders to opt-out of having their works fairly used for training AI for scholarship, then academic institutions and scholars would face even greater hurdles in licensing content for research. Rightsholders might opt out of allowing their work to be used for AI training fair uses, and then turn around and charge AI usage fees to scholars (or libraries)—essentially licensing back fair uses for research.
Fundamentally, this undermines lawmakers’ public interest goals: It creates a risk of rent-seeking or anti-competitive behavior through which a rightsholder can demand additional remuneration or withhold granting licenses for activities generally seen as being good for public knowledge or that rely on exceptions like fair use. And from a practical perspective, allowing opt-outs from fair uses would impede scholarship by or for research teams who lack grant or institutional funds to cover these additional licensing expenses; penalize research in or about underfunded disciplines or geographical regions; and result in bias as to the topics and regions that can be studied.
“Fair use” does not mean “unregulated”
Although training AI for non-profit scholarly uses is fair use from a copyright perspective, we are not suggesting AI training should be unregulated. To the contrary, we support guardrails because training AI can carry risk. For example, researchers have been able to use generative AI like ChatGPT to solicit personal information by bypassing platform safeguards.
To address issues of privacy, ethics, and the rights of publicity (which govern uses of people’s voices, images, and personas), there should be the adoption of best practices, private ordering, and other regulations.
For instance, as to best practices, scholar Matthew Sag has suggested preliminary guidelines to avoid violations of privacy and the right to publicity. First, he recommends that AI platforms avoid training their large language models on duplicates of the same work. This would reduce the likelihood that the models could produce copyright-infringing outputs (due to memorization concerns), and it would also lessen the likelihood that any content containing potentially private or sensitive information would be outputted from having been fed into the training process multiple times. Second, Sag suggests that AI platforms engage in “reinforcement learning through human feedback” when training large language models. This practice could cut down on privacy or rights of publicity concerns by involving human feedback at the point of training, instead of leveraging filtering at the output stage.
Private ordering would rely on platforms or communities to implement appropriate policies governing privacy issues, rights of publicity, and ethical concerns. For example, the UC Berkeley Library has created policies and practices (called “Responsible Access Workflows”) to help it make decisions around whether—and how—special collection materials may be digitized and made available online. Our Responsible Access Workflows require review of collection materials across copyright, contracts, privacy, and ethics parameters. Through careful policy development, the Library applies an ethics of care approach to making available online the collection content with ethical concerns. Even if content is not shared openly online, it doesn’t mean it’s unavailable for researchers for use in person; we simply have decided not to make that content available in digital formats with lower friction for use. We aim to apply transparent information about our decision-making, and researchers must make informed decisions about how to use the collections, whether or not they are using them in service of AI.
And finally, concerning regulations, countries like those in the EU have recently introduced an AI training framework that requires, among other things, the disclosure of source content, and the rights for content creators to opt out of having their works included in training sets except when the AI training is being done for research purposes by research organizations, cultural heritage institutions, and their members or scholars. United States agencies could consider implementing similar regulations here.
But from a copyright perspective, and within non-profit academic research, fair use in AI training should be preserved without the opportunity to opt out for the reasons we discuss above. Such an approach regarding copyright would also be consistent with the distinction the EU has made for AI training in academic settings, as the EU’s Digital Single Market Directive bifurcates practices outside the context of scholarly research.
While we favor regulation that preserves fair use, it is also important to note that merely preserving fair use rights in scholarly contexts for training AI is not the end of the story in protecting scholarly inquiry. So long as the United States permits contractual override of fair uses, libraries and researchers will continue to be at the mercy of publishers aggregating and controlling what may be done with the scholarly record, even if authors dedicate their content to the public domain or apply a Creative Commons license to it. So in our view, the real work that should be done is pursuing legislative or regulatory arrangements like the approximately 40 other countries that have curtailed the ability of contracts to abrogate fair use and other limitations and exceptions to copyright within non-profit scholarly and educational uses. This is a challenging, but important, mission.
Licensing guidance in the meantime
While the statutory, regulatory, and private governance landscapes are being addressed, libraries and scholars need ways to preserve usage rights for content when training AI as part of their TDM research methodologies. We have developed sample license language intended to address rightsholders’ key concerns while maintaining scholars’ ability to train AI in text and data mining research. We drafted this language to be incorporated into amendments to existing licenses that fail to address TDM, or into stand-alone TDM and AI licenses; however, it is easily adaptable into agreements-in-chief (and we encourage you to do so).
We are certain our terms can continue to be improved upon over time or be tailored for specific research needs as methodologies and AI uses change. But in the meantime, we think they are an important step in the right direction.
With that in mind, it is important to understand that within contracts applying U.S. law, more specific language controls over general language in a contract. So, even if there is a clause in a license agreement that preserves fair use, if it is later followed by a TDM clause that restricts how TDM can be conducted (and whether AI can be used), then that more specific language governs TDM and AI usage under the agreement. This means that libraries and scholars must be mindful when negotiating TDM and AI clauses as they may be contracting themselves out of rights they would otherwise have had under fair use.
So, how can a library or scholar negotiate sufficient AI usage rights while acknowledging the concerns of publishers? We believe publishers have attempted to curb AI usage because they are concerned about: (1) the security of their licensed products, and the fear that researchers will leak or release content behind their paywall; and (2) AI being used to create a competing product that could substitute for the original licensed product and undermine their share of the market. While these concerns are valid, they reflect longstanding fears over users’ potential generalized misuse of licensed materials in which they do not hold copyright. But publishers are already able to—and do—impose contractual provisions disallowing the creation of derivative products and systematically sharing licensed content with third-parties, so additionally banning the use of AI in doing so is, in our opinion, unwarranted.
We developed our sample licensing language to precisely address these concerns by specifying in the grant of license that research results may be used and shared with others in the course of a user’s academic or non-profit research “except to the extent that doing so would substantially reproduce or redistribute the original Licensed Materials, or create a product for use by third parties that would substitute for the Licensed Materials.” Our language also imposes reasonable security protections in the research and storage process to quell fears of content leakage.
Perhaps most importantly, our sample licensing language preserves the right to conduct TDM using “machine learning”and “other automated techniques” by expressly including these phrases in the definition for TDM, thereby reserving AI training rights (including as such AI training methodologies evolve), provided that no competing product or release of the underlying materials is made.
The licensing road ahead
As legislation and standards around AI continue to develop, we hope to see express contractual allowance for AI training become the norm in academic licensing. Though our licensing language will likely need to adapt to and evolve with policy changes and research or technological advancements over time, we hope the sample language can now assist other institutions in their negotiations, and help set a licensing precedent so that publishers understand the importance of allowing AI training in non-profit research contexts. While a different legislative and regulatory approach may be appropriate in the commercial context, we believe that academic research licenses should preserve the right to incorporate AI, especially without additional costs being passed to subscribing institutions or individual users, as a fundamental element of ensuring a diverse and innovative scholarly record.
Register here to join us on December 7, 2023 at 1pm ET/ 10am PT for the launch of our latest legal guide “Writing about Real People.”
Writing about real people can raise a number of complicated legal issues for authors. Laws governing defamation, privacy, and rights of publicity have a number of fact-specific rules, exceptions, and exceptions to exceptions that can be difficult to navigate without help. We’ve found that these issues can be an obstacle to creation for all types of authors, from bloggers to narrative nonfiction authors to historians, cultural anthropologists, and other scholarly authors.
As part of our highly used series of guides on legal issues for authors, Authors Alliance has created a guide to writing about real people for nonfiction authors. This latest guide covers three main legal issues: false statements and portrayals (e.g., defamation), invasions of privacy, and rights of publicity and identity rights. The guide includes substantial practical guidance, addressing issues such as permission, documenting your research and working with an IRB.
Join us on December 7 to learn more about the guide and what it covers, how you might use it in your work, about plans we have for accompanying materials we will release in the near future, such as one-page summaries for quick reference.
When the tech platforms promised a future of “connection,” they were lying. They said their “walled gardens” would keep us safe, but those were prison walls.
The platforms locked us into their systems and made us easy pickings, ripe for extraction. Twitter, Facebook and other Big Tech platforms hard to leave by design. They hold hostage the people we love, the communities that matter to us, the audiences and customers we rely on. The impossibility of staying connected to these people after you delete your account has nothing to do with technological limitations: it’s a business strategy in service to commodifying your personal life and relationships.
We can – we must – dismantle the tech platforms. In The Internet Con, Cory Doctorow explains how to seize the means of computation, by forcing Silicon Valley to do the thing it fears most: interoperate. Interoperability will tear down the walls between technologies, allowing users leave platforms, remix their media, and reconfigure their devices without corporate permission.
Interoperability is the only route to the rapid and enduring annihilation of the platforms. The Internet Con is the disassembly manual we need to take back our internet.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR CORY DOCTOROW is a science fiction author, activist and journalist. He is the author of many books, most recently RADICALIZED and WALKAWAY, science fiction for adults; HOW TO DESTROY SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM, nonfiction about monopoly and conspiracy; IN REAL LIFE, a graphic novel; and the picture book POESY THE MONSTER SLAYER. His latest book is ATTACK SURFACE, a standalone adult sequel to LITTLE BROTHER. In 2020, he was inducted into the Canadian Science Fiction and Fantasy Hall of Fame. He works for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, is a MIT Media Lab Research Affiliate, is a Visiting Professor of Computer Science at Open University, a Visiting Professor of Practice at the University of North Carolina’s School of Library and Information Science and co-founded the UK Open Rights Group.
Book Talk: The Internet Con by Cory Doctorow Tuesday, October 31 @ 10am PT / 1pm ET Register now for the virtual discussion!
The Authors Alliance found this write-up by Professor Jennifer Rothman at the University of Pennsylvania useful and wanted to share it with our readers. You can find Professor Rothman’s original post on her website, Rothman’s Roadmap to the Right of Publicity, here.
On July 12th, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Intellectual Property held its second hearing about artificial intelligence (AI) and intellectual property, this one was to focus expressly on “copyright” law. Although copyright was mentioned many times during the almost two-hour session and written testimony considered whether the use of unlicensed training data was copyright infringement, a surprising amount of the hearing focused not on copyright law, but instead on the right of publicity.
Both senators and witnesses spent significant time advocating for new legislation—a federal right of publicity or a federal anti-impersonation right (what one witness dubbed the FAIR Act). Discussion of such a federal law occupied more of the hearing than predicted and significantly more time than was spent parsing either existing copyright law or suggesting changes to copyright law.
In Senator Christopher Coons’s opening remarks, he suggested that a federal right of publicity should be considered to address the threat of AI to performers. At the start of his comments, Coons played an AI-generated song about AI set to the tune of New York, New York in the vocal style of Frank Sinatra. Notably, Coons highlighted that he had sought and received permission to use both the underlying copyrighted material and Frank Sinatra’s voice.
In addition to Senator Coons, Senators Marsha Blackburn and Amy Klobuchar expressly called for adding a federal right of publicity. Blackburn, a senator from Tennessee, highlighted the importance of name and likeness rights for the recording artists, songwriters, and actors in her state and pointed to the concerns raised by the viral AI-generated song “Heart on My Sleeve”. This song was created by a prompt to produce a song simulating a song created by and sung by Drake and The Weekend. Ultimately, Universal Music Group got platforms, such as Apple Music and Spotify, to take the song down on the basis of copyright infringement claims. Universal alleged that the use infringed Drake and The Weekend’s copyrighted music and sound recordings. The creation (and popularity!) of the song sent shivers through the music industry.
It therefore is no surprise that Jeffrey Harleston, General Counsel for Universal Music Group, advocated both in his oral and written testimony for a federal right of publicity to protect against “confusion, unfair competition[,] market dilution, and damage” to the reputation and career of recording artists if their voices or vocal styles are imitated in generative AI outputs. Karla Ortiz, a concept artist and illustrator, known for her work on Marvel films, also called for a federal right of publicity in her testimony. Her concerns were tied to the use of her name as a prompt to produce outputs trained on her art in her style and that could substitute for hiring her to create new works. Law Professor Matthew Sag supported adoption of a federal right of publicity to address the “hodgepodge” of state laws in the area.
Dana Rao, the Executive Vice President and General Counsel of Adobe, expressed support for a federal anti-impersonation right, which he noted had a catchy acronym—the FAIR Act. His written testimony on behalf of Adobe highlighted its support for such a law and gave the most details of what such a right might look like. Adobe suggested that such an anti-impersonation law would “offer[] artists protection against” direct economic competition of an AI-generated replication of their style and suggested that this law “would provide a right of action to an artist against those that are intentionally and commercially impersonating their work through AI tools. This type of protection would provide a new mechanism for artists to protect their livelihood from people misusing this new technology, without having to rely solely on copyright, and should include statutory damages to alleviate the burden on artists to prove actual damages, directly addressing the unfairness of an artist’s work being used to train an AI model that then generates outputs that displace the original artist.” Adobe was also open to adoption of “a federal right of publicity . . . to help address concerns about AI being used without permission to copy likenesses for commercial benefit.”
Although some of the testimony supporting a federal right of publicity suggested that many states already extend such protection, there was a consensus that a preemptive federal right could provide greater predictability, consistency, and protection. Senator Klobuchar and Universal Music’s Harleston emphasized the value of elevating the right of publicity to a federal “intellectual property” right. Notably, this would have the bonus of clarifying an open question of whether right of publicity claims are exempted from the Communications Decency Act’s § 230 immunity provision for third-party speech conveyed over internet platforms. (See, e.g. Hepp v. Facebook.)
Importantly, Klobuchar noted the overlap between concerns over commercial impersonation and concerns over deepfakes that are used to impersonate politicians and create false and misleading videos and images that pose a grave danger to democracy.
Of course, the proof is in the pudding. No specific legislation has been floated to my knowledge and so I cannot evaluate its effectiveness or pitfalls. Although the senators and witnesses who spoke about the right of publicity were generally supportive, the details of what such a law might look like were vague.
From the right-holders’ (or identity-holders’) perspective the scope of such a right is crucial. Many open questions exist. If preemptive in nature, how would such a statute affect longstanding state law precedents and the appropriation branch of the common law privacy tort that in many states is the primary vehicle for enforcing the right of publicity? When confronted with similar concerns over adopting a new “right of publicity” to replace New York’s longstanding right of privacy statute that protected against the misappropriation of a person’s name, likeness, and voice, New York legislators astutely recognized the danger of unsettling more than 100 years of precedents that had provided (mostly) predictable protection for individuals in the state.
Another key concern is whether these rights will be transferable away from the underlying identity-holders. If they are, then a federal right of publicity will have a limited and potentially negative impact on the very people who are supposedly the central concern driving the proposed law. This very concern is central to the demands of SAG-AFTRA as part of its current strike. The actors’ union wants to limit the ability of studios and producers to record a person’s performance in one context and then use AI and visual effects to create new performances in different contexts. As I have written at length elsewhere, a right of publicity law (whether federal or otherwise) that does not limit transferability will make identity-holders more vulnerable to exploitation rather than protect them. (See, e.g., Jennifer E. Rothman, The Inalienable Right of Publicity, 100 Georgetown L.J. 185 (2012); Jennifer E. Rothman, What Happened to Brooke Shields was Awful. It Could Have Been Worse, Slate, April 2023.)
Professor Matthew Sag rightly noted the importance of allowing ordinary people—not just the famous or commercially successful—to bring claims for publicity violations. This is a position with which I wholeheartedly agree, but Sag, when pressed on remedies, suggested that there should not be statutory damages. Yet, such damages are usually the best and sometimes only way for ordinary individuals to be able to recover damages and to get legal assistance to bring such claims. In fact, what is often billed as California’s statutory right of publicity for the living (Cal. Civ. Code § 3344) was originally passed under the moniker “right of privacy” and was specifically adopted to extend statutory damages to plaintiffs who did not have external commercial value making damage recovery challenging. (See Jennifer E. Rothman, The Right of Publicity: Privacy Reimagined for a Public World (Harvard Univ. Press 2018)). Notably, Dana Rao of Adobe, recognizing this concern, specifically advocated for the adoption of statutory damages.
The free speech and First Amendment concerns raised by the creation of a federal right of publicity will turn on the specific scope and likely exceptions to such a law. Depending on the particulars, it may be that potential defendants stand more to gain by a preemptive federal law than potential plaintiffs do. If there are clear and preemptive exemptions to liability this will be a win for many repeat defendants in right of publicity cases who now have to navigate a wide variety of differing state laws. And if liability is limited to instances in which there is likely confusion as to participation or sponsorship, the right of publicity will be narrowed from its current scope in most states. (See Robert C. Post and Jennifer E. Rothman, The First Amendment and the Right(s) of Publicity, 130 Yale L.J. 86 (2020)).
In short, the focus in this hearing on “AI and Copyright” on the right of publicity instead supports my earlier take that the right of publicity may pose a significant legal roadblock for developers of AI. Separate from legal liability, AI developers should take seriously the ethical concerns of producing outputs that imitate real people in ways that confuse as to their participation in vocal or audiovisual performances, or in photographs.
Authors Alliance and KnowledgeRights21 are pleased to announce the launch of a new project, “Giving Voice to Authors,” through which Authors Alliance and KR21 will focus efforts over the next year on building up support for European authors who write for the public benefit.
Since its founding, Authors Alliance has welcomed members from all over the world, including many of its founding members and advisory board. Over the last several years, we’ve heard increasing calls for support from European authors who care about the public interest and who write primarily to spread knowledge and ideas. They are concerned that their voices are not being heard in some of the most important information policy debates of our age. For example, as the EU has enacted a series of laws such as the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive, the debate has been dominated by many of the largest corporate rights holders and others to create the perception that authors uniformly support more expansive copyright and draconian enforcement mechanisms, and that authors care little for the rights of users, libraries, or the public. These positions do a disservice to authors who prioritize seeing their creations and the knowledge they advance to reach as many readers as possible.
Many other civil society organizations across Europe have ably countered these policy positions and have sought to advance access to knowledge in the public interest. But without a countervailing voice on behalf of authors, policy makers can all too easily conclude that most or even all authors favor these maximalist copyright positions. Authors Alliance aims to help give voice to European authors who have a countervailing view.
How you can participate We’re already hearing from European authors and others asking how they contribute to ensuring that their voices are heard in these important debates. To start:
Join Authors Alliance. Joining as a member of Authors Alliance is a simple but important way to help us speak out on behalf of those authors who share our mission of promoting policies that would make creative works accessible and discoverable. Membership numbers help us better magnify your voices and lend weight to our input in policy debates. You can join for free online at www.authorsalliance.org/join.
Contribute your expertise. Authors Alliance is committed to promoting policy positions based on sound research and expertise. We’ve been fortunate to collaborate in the past with some of the world’s leading experts on copyright, technology, and the creative economy. Likewise, we want to collaborate with leading experts on European policy. This includes direct collaboration on research projects, or in highlighting the results of those projects to a wider audience of authors through blogs, op-eds or other publications, or bringing that research to the forefront in discussions with policymakers.
Collaborate and convene. In the Fall of 2023 and Spring 2024 Authors Alliance plans to host several in-person convenings with European authors, law and policy experts, and members of the broader community of civil society organizations across Europe that support more equitable and open access to information. If you are interested in attending or hosting such a meeting, we would love to hear from you. The easiest way to get in touch is by email: info@authorsalliance.org.
Reading publishing agreements–even for short academic articles–can be extremely time consuming. For many academic publishers, you’ll find an array of information about your rights and obligations as an author, often spread across multiple websites and guides, in addition to the publishing contract itself. It’s tempting to just assume that these terms are standard and reasonable. For open access publications, I’ve unfortunately found this attitude to be especially prevalent because authors tend to think that by publishing on an OA basis, the only contract terms that really matter are those of the Creative Commons license they choose for their article.
That can be a dangerous strategy. Elsevier and Wiley OA publishing agreements, which have long-standing issues along these lines as noted here,here, here, and here, highlight the problem really well.
Those publishing agreements do provide what many authors want in OA publishing–free online access and broad reuse rights to users. But, if authors select the wrong option, they are also giving away their own residual rights while granting Elsevier or Wiley the exclusive right to commercially exploit their work. That includes the right for those publishers to exclude the author herself from making or authorizing even the most basic of commercial uses, such as posting the article to a for-profit repository like Researchgate or even SSRN. This is not a result I think most authors intend, but it’s hard to spot the problem unless you read these publication agreements carefully.
Let’s dig into the agreements to understand what’s going on.
CC License Restrictions and Some Thoughts on Why Authors Choose Them
First, a quick primer on open access licensing (you can read a longer introduction and overview of open access in our dedicated guide on the topic). Just about every major academic publisher now offers some option to make your scholarly article available open access. I won’t get into the debate about what exactly constitutes “open access.” I think its sufficient to say that for most authors, “open access” means at minimum free online access to the work combined with some grant of permissive reuse rights to readers. While there are some exceptions, Creative Commons licenses have emerged as the defacto default legal infrastructure through which those reuse rights are granted.
Creative Commons licenses give rightsholders a number of options to exercise control over their work even while freely distributing it. The most common and basic CC license, CC-BY, does so by allowing basically all types of reuse (copying, commercial distribution, creation of derivative works) on the condition that the reuser appropriately attribute the original work. Creative Commons also has other licenses that limit downstream reuse in a few ways. Two of the most common for scholarly works are CC-BY-NC, and CC-BY-NC-ND, which respectively limit reuse to non-commercial uses (non-commercial or “NC”) and limit reuses to disallow distribution of derivative works (no derivatives or “ND”). Creative Commons also offers a CC-BY-ND license, which permits commercial uses but not the distribution of derivative works, but this is a less popular option. OpenAlex (an awesome research tool from OurResearch) indicates that there are some 5.5+ million scholarly works (mostly articles and similar) published under CC-BY-NC and CC-BY-NC-ND licenses.
In my experience, authors select these more restrictive licenses for a few reasons. Typically, authors will select a non-derivatives (ND) license because they’re concerned about some downstream user modifying their work and creating a new work that misrepresents the original or that is just of poor quality (think of a bad translation). For those authors, they want a say in how their work is built upon to create new derivatives. I’ve found this to be especially important to authors of controversial works that could be recast or adapted in ways that don’t include appropriate context.
For authors selecting the non-commericial (NC) license restriction, the reasons are more varied, but I typically hear authors express concern about others profiting without their consent, especially from those who are attuned to the problems of large corporate interests who may seek to republish their work for a profit without the author’s input.
The Elsevier and Wiley OA Publishing Agreements
I have neverhad an author say that they selected a CC-BY-NC or CC-BY-NC-ND license because they wanted to be sure that only their large, multinational commercial publisher could profit from their article, to the exclusion of everyone else including the author herself. Yet, if you read these agreements closely, that’s exactly what some publishers’ agreements do.
Let’s start with Elsevier. It’s agreement is at least somewhat upfront about what’s going on. Elsevier’s sample CC-BY-NC publishing agreement states in the first paragraph that the author grants Elsevier “an exclusive publishing and distribution license in the manuscript identified above . . . in print, electronic and all other media (whether now known or later developed), in any form, in all languages, throughout the world, for the full term of copyright, and the right to license others to do the same[.]”
The key word in that license grant is the word “exclusive,” which means that Elsevier has the right to exclude everyone else (including the author) from using the article, except as agreed through the CC-BY-NC-ND license. In case there was any doubt, Elsevier makes clear on the same page that “I understand that the license of publishing rights I have granted to the Journal gives the Journal the exclusive right to make or sub-license commercial use.” The agreement does include a narrow carve out for authors to engage in some narrow categories of reuse that may go beyond the CC-BY-NC-ND license (e.g., lengthen the article to book form), but they are a far cry from the rights the author would otherwise have had he or she retained copyright and granted Elsvier a simple non-exclusive license to publish the article.
The Wiley journal agreement ultimately accomplishes a similar result, though in my opinion it is a bit more misleading. First, authors will find Wiley’s OA sample publishing agreements through a page that advertises “Retain copyright with a Creative Commons license.” It states, innocently, that “with Creative Commons licenses, the author retains copyright and the public is allowed to reuse the content. You grant Wiley a license to publish the article and to identify as the original publisher.”
If you read the sample Wiley agreements for publishing under a CC-BY-NC or CC-BY-NC-ND license, you will in fact find that the agreements do in fact provide that “The Contributor . . . retains all proprietary rights, such as copyright and patent rights in any process, procedure or article of manufacture described in the Contribution.”
This sounds great! The problem comes if you keep reading the rest of the agreement. Later in the agreement, you will find that while the author “retains copyright,” that copyright is reduced to a shell of itself. You’ll see that Wiley (which actually refers to itself as the “Owner,” to set the tone) has the author agree to grant “to the Owner [Wiley], during the full term of the Contributor’s copyright and any extensions or renewals, an exclusive license of all rights of copyright in and to the Contribution that the Contributor does not grant under the CC-BY-NC-ND license.” So, if the author’s intent is to retain control over commercial reuse or derivative works, think again.
Like Elsevier, Wiley does grant back some slivers of those rights to authors. For example, the right to make a translation as long as you only post it to your personal website, or the right to reuse the article in a collection published by a scholarly society (but, it definitely can’t be in any work with outside commercial sponsorship; Wiley seems particularly concerned with volumes sponsored by pharmaceutical companies, which they specifically target in the agreement).
A few tips for reading your OA publishing agreement
Read (and negotiate) your publishing agreement! Clearly, reading your agreements is important. For OA agreements, you should specifically look for language that either transfers copyright to the publisher or language that grants the publisher a broad exclusive license. If it does contain such a grant or license, think about what rights you might need that go beyond the rights granted to the general public under the CC license that you chose. The best publishing agreements are simple and straightforward, granting the publisher a license to publish and otherwise leaving all rights with the author. There are lots of good examples–e.g., this is one of my favorites, from Emory and the University of Michigan for long-form scholarship. And for more tips on understanding and negotiating your publishing agreement, check out our dedicated guide on the topic.
Don’t buy the website sales pitch. If there is a conflict between what the publisher says on its website and what the contract says, the contract will absolutely control. Be careful about any assurances that exist outside the four corners of your contract. More than once I’ve found authors ask editors via email about reuses that go beyond the agreement. Typically, editors are happy to assure authors that they can do reasonable things with their own articles, but unfortunately, the standard publishing agreements are far less reasonable than most editors. Where the editors’ assurance and publishing agreements conflict, once again the terms of the publishing agreement will prevail.
Watch for contract language about retaining rights. Don’t be fooled into thinking that you’ll retain significant rights in your work by the sleight of hand that says you “retain copyright,” or that you will have “copyright in your name.” If a publisher is obtaining a license of exclusive rights from you, that means the publisher can exclude you and everyone else from making use of those rights unless the agreement contains an explicit grant back of rights to engage in those activities. This is actually very common in non-OA publishing agreements, but as the Elsevier and Wiley agreements illustrate, you need to watch out for it in OA publishing agreements as well.
Authors Alliance is pleased to announce the next in our joint book talk series with the Internet Archive. Join us as we host Internet Archive’s founder BREWSTER KAHLE in conversation with JESSICA LITMAN to talk about her book, Digital Copyright.
In Digital Copyright (read now), law professor Jessica Litman questions whether copyright laws crafted by lawyers and their lobbyists really make sense for the vast majority of us. Should every interaction between ordinary consumers and copyright-protected works be restricted by law? Is it practical to enforce such laws, or expect consumers to obey them? What are the effects of such laws on the exchange of information in a free society?
PROFESSOR JESSICA LITMAN, the John F. Nickoll Professor of Law, is the author of Digital Copyright and the co-author, with Jane Ginsburg and Mary Lou Kevlin, of the casebook Trademarks and Unfair Competition Law: Cases and Materials.
BREWSTER KAHLE, founder and digital librarian of the Internet Archive, has been working to provide universal access to all knowledge for more than 25 years.
Book Talk: Digital Copyright April 20, 2023 @ 10am PT / 1pm ET Register now for the free, virtual discussion
“In Athena Unbound, Peter Baldwin offers an admirably pragmatic yet principled approach to the perennial problem of encouraging both the production and distribution of knowledge.” – Paul Romer, Nobel Laureate and University Professor, NYU
Book Talk: Athena Unbound March 28 @ 10am PT / 1pm ET Register now for the virtual event
Read or purchase Athena Unbound from MIT Press. (Pub date: March 28, 2023)
Open access (OA) could one day put the sum of human knowledge at our fingertips. But the goal of allowing everyone to read everything faces fierce resistance. In Athena Unbound, Peter Baldwin offers an up-to-date look at the ideals and history behind OA, and unpacks the controversies that arise when the dream of limitless information slams into entrenched interests in favor of the status quo. In addition to providing a clear analysis of the debates, Baldwin focuses on thorny issues such as copyright and ways to pay for “free” knowledge. He also provides a roadmap that would make OA economically viable and, as a result, advance one of humanity’s age-old ambitions.
Baldwin addresses the arguments in terms of disseminating scientific research, the history of intellectual property and copyright, and the development of the university and research establishment. As he notes, the hard sciences have already created a funding model that increasingly provides open access, but at the cost of crowding out the humanities. Baldwin proposes a new system that would shift costs from consumers to producers and free scholarly knowledge from the paywalls and institutional barriers that keep it from much of the world.
Rich in detail and free of jargon, Athena Unbound is an essential primer on the state of the global open access movement.
About our speakers
PETER BALDWIN is Professor of History at UCLA, and Global Distinguished Professor at NYU. His recent books are Command and Persuade: Crime, Law, and the State across History (MIT Press); Fighting the First Wave: Why the Coronavirus Was Tackled So Differently across the Globe; and The Copyright Wars: Three Centuries of Trans-Atlantic Battle. He serves on the boards of the New York Public Library, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Wikimedia Endowment, the Central European University, the Danish Institute of Advanced Studies, and as chair of the Board of the Center for Jewish History. His journalistic writings have appeared in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, CNN, Newsweek, New Republic, Huffington Post, Der Spiegel, Berliner Zeitung, Publishers Weekly, American Interest, Chronicle of Higher Education, Prospect, American Interest, and Zocalo Public Square.
CHRIS BOURG is the Director of Libraries at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), where she also has oversight of the MIT Press. She is also the founding director of the Center for Research on Equitable and Open Scholarship (CREOS). Prior to assuming her role at MIT, Chris worked for 12 years in the Stanford University Libraries. Before Stanford, she spent 10 years as an active-duty U.S. Army officer, including three years on the faculty at the United States Military Academy at West Point. She received her BA from Duke University, her MA from the University of Maryland, and her MA and Ph.D. in sociology from Stanford.
Book Talk: Athena Unbound March 28 @ 10am PT / 1pm ET Register now for the virtual event
Earlier this week, you might have seen news that former President Donald Trump has filed a new lawsuit, this time against journalist Bob Woodward and his publisher Simon & Schuster. The suit alleges, among other things, that Bob Woodward and Simon & Schuster are infringing Trump’s copyright interests by copying and distributing eight hours of “raw” interviews that Trump gave to Woodward over the course of 2019 and 2020. The complaint alleges that the interviews were recorded by Woodward for purposes of his book, Rage, which was released in September 2021, on the condition that the recordings only be used for that book. In October of 2022, and without Trump’s consent, Woodward and Simon & Schuster released The Trump Tapes: Bob Woodward’s Twenty Interviews with President Donald Trump, which contained nearly complete audio recordings of the interviews, prompting Trump’s lawsuit.
The suit is actually pretty interesting from a copyright perspective and might yield some lessons for those who work with interviews or oral histories, or who interact with papers of elected officials. We thought it was a good opportunity to talk about some of the issues that it raises that we commonly hear about from authors:
Copyright in Interviews
A important question in the suit will likely be whether Trump has any copyright ownership interest in the interviews. Ownership of copyright in interviews is not as clear cut as you might think. In a typical interview, oral history, or similar recording you’d have at least two people contributing – the interviewer (in this case, Woodward) and the interviewee (Trump). Assuming for a moment that such contributions are sufficiently original and creative–not a high bar– and knowing as we do that they are adequately fixed since they were recorded at the direction of both parties, you’d probably conclude that rights in the interviews would rest at least originally with one or both of Woodward or Trump.
Over the years a few commentators have written about the issue of rights in interviews, and two basic approaches to ownership have emerged:
A “split copyright” theory: concluding that the contribution of the interviewer and interviewee are actually two separate works, each owned independently of the other.
A “joint ownership” theory: concluding that the contribution of the interviewer and interviewee were created with “the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole” and therefore there is just one work with two copyright owners.
Surprisingly, there isn’t much clear case law on point. Probably the most helpful case is Suid v. Newsweek, a 1980 district court case that takes the “split copyright” approach. That case was brought as a federal copyright infringement claim by Lawrence Suid, who in 1978 published a 357-page book titled “Guts Glory-Great American War Movies.” The book included previously unpublished interviews that Suide conducted with figures such as Bruce Wayne, Jack Valenti, and Michael Wayne. Newsweek in 1979 published a four page article about John Wayne that included interview quotes copied from Suid’s book. Suid sued for copyright infringement. For the interviews, the court concluded that Suid did not have a valid claim because the quotes originated with the interviewee (in this case, Wayne) and not Suid himself. The court explained, “the author of a factual work may not, without an assignment of copyright, claim copyright in statements made by others and reported in the work since the author may not claim originality as to those statements.”
This “split copyright” approach is also the one apparently taken by the U.S. Copyright Office when it reviews registration applications for interviews. The Copyright Office Compendium III (Section 719) explains that:
The U.S. Copyright Office will assume that the interviewer and the interviewee own the copyright in their respective questions and responses unless (i) the work is claimed as a joint work, (ii) the applicant provides a transfer statement indicating that the interviewer or the interviewee transferred his or her rights to the copyright claimant, or (iii) the applicant indicates that the interview was created or commissioned as a work made for hire.
For the “joint copyright” approach – the logic is straightforward and favored by several commenters including prominent treatises such as Patry on Copyright and Nimmer on Copyright. John A. Neuenschwander, author of the extremely helpful A Guide to Oral History and the Lawalso favors this view. Because a joint work is only created when there is intent that the contributions be merged, it does raise important factual questions about what the parties were thinking when they conducted the interview.
As for Trump and Woodward, the difference between which of these two approaches might apply could matter a great deal. If the interviews are considered two separate works, and Trump actually owns rights in his portion of the interview (a big “if” – more below), he may well have a valid copyright infringement claim. If it is a joint work, however, he may not have an infringement claim but could have a claim to a share of the royalties. That’s because for a joint work, an owner of an interest in that work is allowed full use of the work, but has to account to the other joint owners for any profits resulting from that use.
Government Works
Whether Trump has any interest at all–either as a joint-owner and independently–depends on at least one other determination: whether Trump’s contributions are a “work of the United States Government.” It’s an important question for this case, but also an issue whose resolution could have important implications for authors who are using source materials that originate with U.S. Government officials, particularly elected officials.
Section 105 of the Copyright Act provides that “Copyright protection under this title is not available for any work of the United States Government.” And, a work of the U.S. Government is in turn defined as “a work prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Government as part of that person’s official duties.”
For Trump’s case, this matters because he was President at the time that he granted the interviews. So, the question is whether Trump’s contributions are a “work of the United States government” – i.e., were they prepared by “an officer or employee” of the government, and were they made “as part of that person’s official duties”?
As you might imagine, for most people receiving a paycheck from the federal government, this is a pretty straightforward question. Their employment status and job description are well defined, and it’s usually easy to identify when a work falls within or outside their official duties. For example, a lawyer for the Department of Justice who at night writes fantasy novels would be just as entitled to copyright protection for those novels as any other author would for their own novel. Similarly, when that same lawyer writes a memo for a case they are working on, it would be well within the scope of their employment.
But, the office of the President is a bit different, and as far as we’re aware, there isn’t clear guidance on whether creative works of the President in this context would be covered by Section 105. The statute isn’t widely litigated-–there are only about ten published cases ever that say anything about what it actually means–-but the Supreme Court in Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org recently had the opportunity to explain that “the bar on copyright protection for federal works . . . applies to works created by all federal ‘officer[s] or employee[s],’ without regard for the nature of their position or scope of their authority.” And for its part, the Copyright Office has interpreted this to mean that “this includes works created by the President; Congress; the federal judiciary; federal departments, agencies, boards, bureaus, or commissions; or any other officer or employee of the U.S. federal government while acting within the course of his or her official duties.” One would imagine that Trump’s lawyers would push back on such a view–potentially arguing that the President is neither an “officer” or “employee” of the U.S. Government, but in a category all its own (an argument not without precedent in other contexts) or alternatively, that even if he is covered as one of those categories of individuals, his interviews were not part of his “official duties.” Whether either argument would be successful, we don’t know.
If this suit actually moves forward, it will be an interesting one to watch, especially for authors engaged in writing that relies on interviews, oral histories, or materials related to the President.
Other notes, if you care to read more
If you’re interested in the issue of copyright in interviews, there are a handful of cases addressing ownership in interviews under common law copyright (i.e., state law that was formerly applicable, but not here). A few of the most cited are Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, a NY case from 1968 in which Hemingway’s estate asserted a common law copyright claim against Random House for publication of Hemingway’s oral statements, and Falwell v. Penthouse International, a case arising under Virginia law in which Reverend Jerry Falwell sued Penthouse for publication of his oral statements. Both those cases raised issues aboutrights in oral statements that were never “fixed” (e.g., written down, recorded) with the authorization of the speaker. But neither is particularly helpful for this Trump-Woodward case, both because federal law applies and because it seems clear that Trump authorized the recordings.
You may also encounter an unusual case, arising under federal copyright law, titled Taggart v. WMAQ Channel 5 Chicago, a short opinion from the Southern District of Chicago from 2000. The case was brought as a pro se action by Arthur Taggart, an individual who was convicted of and incarcerated for multiple felonies. Taggart was interviewed by WMAQ, a Chicago TV station while in prison. WMAQ then broadcast portions of those interviews, which Taggart did not consent to, highlighting unfavorable facts that Taggart admitted to on tape. Taggart sued for copyright infringement, but the court dismissed his claim. The court made several highly questionable assertions about Taggart’s potential interest in the work. For example, suggesting that even though the work was recorded with Taggart’s approval, because Taggart was not directly in control of the recording device, he could not claim an interest: “if anyone was the ‘author,’ ” the court reasoned, “it may very well have been the cameraman who fixed the ideas into a tangible expression, the videotape.” The court also suggested that, despite Taggart communicating quite vividly in the interview, and WMAQ reproducing his expression verbatim, “the utterances made during an interview are not an expression of an idea for the purpose of copyright law, they are simply an idea, and thus not subject to copyright protection.” This approach to fixation and creativity have been criticized in several places (e.g., this helpful law review note by Mary Catherine Amerine) and seems to us a clear outlier.
