Category Archives: Blog

Judge Blocks Penguin Random House/Simon & Schuster Merger

Posted November 2, 2022
Photo by Sasun Bughdaryan on Unsplash

On Monday, Judge Florence Pan issued an order enjoining (or blocking) the proposed merger of Penguin Random House and Simon & Schuster following a weeks-long trial in the D.C. Circuit. Authors Alliance has been monitoring the case and covering it on this blog for the past year. While Judge Pan’s full opinion is not yet public—it is currently sealed while each party determines what information it would like to be redacted as confidential—but her decision to block the proposed merger strikes a blow for efforts to consolidate major trade publishers and signals judicial concern about too little competition in the publishing industry. 

Judge Pan (who was appointed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to replace then-judge Kentanji Brown Jackson in September, but has continued to preside over this district court case), issued a short order announcing the decision. Judge Pan found that the Department of Justice had “shown that ‘the effect of [the proposed merger] may be substantially to lessen competition’ in the market for the U.S. publishing rights to anticipated top-selling books.” She concluded that the merger could not move forward under U.S. antitrust law, which seeks to protect market competition and ensure that no one firm wields too much power. 

The DOJ applauded the decision, with Assistant Attorney General Jonathan Kanter stating that the decision “protects vital competition for books and is a victory for authors, readers, and the free exchange of ideas,” and that the merger would have “reduced competition [and] decreased author income.” Penguin Random House, on the other hand, has already signaled that it is considering appealing the decision, and initially indicated it would be filing an “expedited appeal” before walking back this position in later comments. Jonathan Karp, president and CEO of Simon & Schuster, released a statement to the firm’s employees indicating Penguin Random House’s plans to appeal and stating that Simon & Schuster would be reviewing the decision and conferring with Penguin Random House to determine “next steps.” 

The parties have until November 4th to propose redactions to her opinion, which Judge Pan will then decide on, before the court releases it to the public. There is no set timeline for the full decision being released, but the short timeline for the parties to request redactions could signal that the process will not take long. 

One interesting aspect of the case is that the government focused on the market for “anticipated bestsellers” in its filings and argument, as well as the effect that lessened competition would have on authors, not the general public. Judge Pan adopted this position in her order, apparently accepting the argument as valid. Typically, antitrust focuses on harm to consumers, and indeed, Penguin Random House argued staunchly that the lack of a tangible harm to consumers meant the proposed merger did not pose an antitrust problem.

But were the merger to go forward, with fewer firms bidding on books expected to be commercially successful, the authors of those books could receive lower advances or less favorable contract terms due to the lessened competition. While the government chose to focus on a narrow segment of the book market (a move which faced criticism by some), the point that publishing house consolidation can hurt authors’ interests by giving them fewer choices is an important one.

Authors Alliance cares deeply about ensuring that our publishing ecosystem is diverse and vibrant, and the merger could have had deleterious effects on this diversity. At the same time, the focus on the anticipated bestseller market demonstrates one pitfall of the publishing industry: authors of commercial bestsellers tend to be centered as the authors whose interests are most important or worthy of attention, but these represent a vanishingly small percentage of working authors. Many of Authors Alliance’s members are authors who do not publish with trade publishers like Penguin Random House and S&S, and these authors have different motivations and priorities than authors of anticipated bestsellers. It is important that the government consider a variety of different types of authors as they work to shape author-friendly laws and policies, and we look forward to engaging with policy makers to help raise awareness of this important issue. 

Privacy for Public-Minded Authors Part I

Posted October 25, 2022
Photo by Dayne Topkin on Unsplash

Privacy may not seem like an important issue for authors who write to be read: after all, our members are often motivated by a desire to share their creations broadly. But writing in the digital world increasingly presents us with new considerations in the realm of personal and digital privacy. This post surveys an important privacy-related issue for authors: the right to speak or write anonymously, and will be the first in a new series on privacy considerations for public-minded authors. 

Why Publish Anonymously?

The tradition of authors publishing anonymously, or under a pseudonym, stretches back centuries. Authors choose to publish works of authorship under pseudonyms or anonymously for a variety of reasons. Authors affiliated with academic institutions may prefer to publish their work under a different name in order to keep their academic and authorial identities separate. Some authors publish under both their real names and pseudonyms to explore new styles or genres of writing. Authors writing about controversial topics may also choose to use pseudonyms or publish anonymously in order to maintain personal privacy while contributing to our understanding of such topics. Pseudonyms also allow authors to write works jointly under a single name.

Historical Pseudonyms 

Notable pseudonyms from the past show the breadth of motivations authors might have for pursuing this path, as well as the advantages of using pseudonyms. For example, in the mid-1800s, the Brontë sisters (Anne, Charlotte, and Emily) began publishing under the names Acton, Currer, and Ellis Bell to conceal the fact that they were women. After being rejected from multiple literary publications due to gender biases of the time, writing under male pen names gave the Brontës a path forward to share their creations with the world. Jane Eyre and Wuthering Heights have had a deep and profound impact on our literary tradition, and the Brontës’ ability to publish pseudonymously is what made this possible.

The 19th century writer Mary Ann Evans (better known by her pen name, George Eliot), on the other hand, elected to use a male pen name in order to disassociate herself from preconceived notions about female authors. She was also motivated by a desire to keep her previous work as a translator, critic, and editor—which did bear her real name—separate from her identity as a fiction author. Other authors from the past, such as C.S. Lewis and the famed contemporary Italian novelist Elena Ferrante, have used pen names in order to maintain their personal privacy and avoid public scrutiny while still engaging with the literary world. 

Pseudonyms can also allow multiple authors to work together under a single author name, to better appeal to readers or to accommodate publishing conventions. The idea for the Nancy Drew books, for example, originated with Edward Stratemeyer, who also created the Hardy Boys series. Stratemeyer generated ideas for childrens’ novels and then hired ghostwriters to execute his vision. The series’ “author,” Carolyn Keene, never existed. Instead, her name stands in for the slew of ghostwriters who wrote the novels over time. By using a single author name for these books, Stratemeyer (and later, his estate) was able to create a sense of continuity and build reputational capital for the fictional Keene, captivating multiple generations of young readers.

Anonymous Works

Rather than use a pseudonym, some authors choose to publish their works anonymously, so that no author at all is listed on or associated with the work. Like using a pseudonym, publishing anonymously divorces the author’s real identity from the work. But unlike using a pseudonym, an anonymous work conspicuously lacks an author at all. Throughout history, politically or socially controversial works have been published anonymously. Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein was originally published anonymously, and some have speculated that this was due in part to her fear of losing custody of her children were she to be associated with the monstrous tale. More recently, Go Ask Alice, a book about a 15-year old girl’s descent into drug addiction, was published anonymously. The work presented itself as a diary, and the anonymous author led to debate about the work’s veracity. While the book is now considered to be fictional, the anonymous authorship created an implication that the work was somehow a “real” diary, which colored the reading experience for contemporaneous audiences.

Pseudonyms, Anonymity and Copyright

The U.S. Copyright system accommodates authors’ rights to publish pseudonymously in a number of different ways, underscoring the importance of this right as a matter of public policy. First, and most importantly, the Copyright Act provides an avenue for an author to register their work under a pseudonym (longtime readers may recall that copyright registration is not necessary in order for a work to be protected by copyright, but can provide significant benefits in many circumstances). An author can use both their pseudonym and their legal name on their copyright registration, or their pseudonym only. If an author does use their legal name on their copyright registration for a pseudonymously published work, it is important to understand from a privacy perspective that the author’s legal name will become a part of the public record, as copyright registrations are publicly available. If an author registers their copyright under a pseudonym and does not use their legal name in the registration, their legal name will not be made public.

However, there is a trade off for authors who register copyrights under a pseudonym. The duration of copyright protection is different for pseudonymously authored works: rather than being the life of the author plus 70 years, the copyright term for pseudonymous works is 95 years from the date of creation. This is because, without a real person’s identity to associate with the copyright, it is impossible to measure the life of the author. Additionally, a pseudonym itself cannot be copyrighted, as names and short phrases are outside the scope of copyright protection (though in some instances, words or marks identifying the author could be protected in other ways, such as by trademark law). This means that it is possible for multiple authors to use the same pseudonym, which can create confusion for readers and be a detriment to those authors’ ability to reach them. 

Authors are also empowered by the copyright system to register copyrights anonymously. As with pseudonymous works, anonymous works are subject to copyright protection for 95 years from the date of creation, since the life of the author cannot be ascertained without an author being named. Even if a work is registered anonymously, its author can sue to enforce the copyright (though they will likely lose their anonymity in the process). Anonymous works pose challenges for secondary users, however, because it leaves creators who may want to use the anonymous works in their own works without a point of contact.

Authors Alliance Signs on to Amicus Brief in Hunley v. Instagram

Posted October 12, 2022
Photo by Timothy L Brock on Unsplash

Authors Alliance is pleased to announce that we have joined with several civil society and library organizations (EFF, CCIA, ALA, ARL, OTW and ACRL) on an amicus brief submitted to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hunley v. Instagram, a case about whether individuals and organizations that merely link to content can be liable for secondary copyright infringement, a judicial doctrine which places liability on a party that knowingly contributes to or facilitates copyright infringement, but does not itself directly infringe a copyright. More specifically, the case asks whether Instagram can be secondarily liable for copyright infringement when users use its “embedding” feature, whereby websites and platforms can employ code to display an Instagram post within their own content. 

The Case

The case arose when a group of photographers, who had captured images related to the death of George Floyd and the 2016 election, became upset that their images were being used in a variety of media outlets without permission. The outlets had used Instagram’s embedding tool to link and post the images rather than copying the images directly. The photographers then sued Instagram in the Northern District of California, on the theory that by offering the “embedding” feature, it was facilitating copyright infringement of others and therefore liable.

The district court dismissed the photographers’ claim because it did not pass muster under an inquiry known as the “server test,” established in the seminal Ninth Circuit case, Perfect 10 v. Amazon. The server test is premised on the idea that a website or platform does not violate the copyright holder’s exclusive right to display their work when a copy of the work is not stored on that website or platform’s servers. In short, the inquiry asks whether the work was stored on a website’s server, in which case the website could be liable for infringement, or whether that website merely links elsewhere without storing a copy of the work, in which case it cannot. When media outlets in this case embedded Instagram posts into their content, they did so using code that embeds and displays the post, but the posts were not actually stored on the outlets’ servers. Therefore, the district court found that Instagram was not liable for secondary infringement under the server test.  

The photographers have appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to challenge the validity of the server test for embedded content. It is worth noting that district courts in other circuits have disapproved of the Ninth Circuit’s Perfect 10 server test and found that embedding can constitute secondary infringement in some cases, and it is not applied in all jurisdictions. For this reason, some have speculated that the Ninth Circuit’s server test is ripe for revisiting

The Brief

Our amicus brief asks the Ninth Circuit to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the photographers’ complaint and the continued viability of the server test. It argues that the Perfect 10 server test should not be discarded, as it has paved the way for an internet that depends on the use of hyperlinks to connect information and present it efficiently. The brief explains how linking works, why linking is important, and the negative consequences for a wide variety of internet users—including authors—that could occur if the court narrows or rejects the server test. 

First, our brief explains how embedding and linking work: when an article or website links to other content, it accomplishes this by using computer code to incorporate another’s content into the work and/or direct users to it. Our brief argues that linking, and particularly the act of inline linking (providing links within the text of a website or blog post itself, as we have done throughout this post) is fundamental to the internet as we know it. Online advertising, message boards, and social media platforms depend on the ability to connect sources of information and direct users elsewhere online. 

Second, our brief argues that abandoning or narrowing the Perfect 10 server test could introduce liability for inline linking. Like embedding social media posts, inline linking to other content incorporates materials created by others indirectly without the secondary user actually hosting that content on a server. In this way, inline linking allows internet users to efficiently verify information or learn more about a given topic in just a click. Inline linking is in this way analogous to embedding, meaning that a decision in favor of secondary liability in this case could threaten the legality of inline linking, potentially disrupting the very fabric of the internet as we know it.

Like the general internet-using public, authors also depend on their ability to link to other sources in their online writings to cite to other sources and engage with other works of authorship. In fact, this is why we decided to weigh in on this case: a decision that introduces liability for inline linking could drastically alter how authors can cite to other sources of information and how they can conduct research in a digital environment. Authors rely on inline linking to save space and preserve the readability of their works while citing sources and engaging with other works. Authors also depend on online linking to perform research, as it can quickly and easily direct them to new sources of information. As more and more works are born digital, an author’s ability to link to other content to enrich their scholarship has become more important than ever. It is crucial that this ability is protected in order for the internet to continue to be an engine of learning and the advancement of knowledge. 

So far, the parties have submitted their opening briefs in this case, and several other amicus briefs have been filed. Oral argument has not yet been scheduled. Authors Alliance will keep our readers informed about updates in this case as it moves forward. 

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Wiley Removes Over 1,300 Ebooks from Academic Library Collections 

Posted October 7, 2022
chair and empty bookshelf” by Mark Z. is licensed under CC BY-NC 2.0.

Last month, publisher John Wiley & Sons made headlines when it made the controversial decision to abruptly remove over 1,300 ebooks from academic library collections. It did so by removing these titles from ProQuest Academic Complete, a large collection of ebooks that many libraries subscribe to. Earlier this week, Wiley made headlines again when it announced it was temporarily restoring access in the face of public pressure. 

As has unfortunately been typical with other changes in how publishers work (or refuse to work) with libraries, authors of these books were left in the dark, with little say on the decision. We have heard from many authors who believe, as we do, that libraries play an extraordinarily important role in preserving and providing access to the materials we write, in all formats, and we believe they should be able to purchase access on reasonable terms so they can fulfill their missions.  We’re writing this post to highlight the Wiley situation and outline some ways that authors can make their voices heard. 

The Wiley Ebook Situation

Wiley’s move was particularly shocking since the removal of access coincided with the beginning of the academic term. Countless students who were relying on library access to textbooks they needed for their academic courses lost this access exactly when these texts were most needed. It is increasingly common for publishers of academic texts like these to refuse to sell electronic copies to libraries at all, which seems to be the tactic Wiley was pursuing here, leaving these students with no low cost alternative (and in fact, Wiley reportedly refuses to sell textbooks to libraries at all, in either digital or print format). This left instructors scrambling to find new texts to assign, redesign syllabi, and otherwise adopt their courses to a loss of access to the Wiley texts, at a moment when their attention should have been focused on teaching and welcoming students. 

Unsurprisingly, the decision was widely condemned by librarians, civil society organizations, and university libraries. #ebookSOS, which  has been working to highlight these kinds of challenges for several years, organized several efforts in protest. 

Authors Alliance began working with #ebookSOS to raise awareness of this issue among authors whose works were removed from library collections in an effort to encourage Wiley to reverse its decision and provide assurances that it will not take measures like these in the future. The authors we’ve heard from want their books to be read, to serve learning, and to be used to share knowledge with the world. Some of these authors view Wiley’s decision as a betrayal, and indeed, it is hard to square with Wiley’s asserted commitment to “​​[e]nabling discovery by supporting access to knowledge and fueling the engines of research.”

Earlier this week, Wiley relented. It announced that it had decided to temporarily reverse course, restoring access to the removed texts until June 2023, when they will once again be removed. Wiley apologized for the “disruption” the move caused to students, libraries, and instructors, admitting that it caught them off guard. But while this may ease the burden on instructors and students for now, librarians have resoundingly found the measure to be insufficient. Temporarily restoring access to these particular texts does not solve the fundamental problem that large publishers like Wiley can—and do—unilaterally and without warning remove books from digital library shelves, even if their motive is purely to increase their own profits. We’ve continued to hear from authors who have strong reservations both about Wiley’s decision and how it went about making it. If you are an author published by Wiley and have thoughts about its decision to remove access to these ebooks, we would love to hear from you:  Please write to us at info@authorsalliance.org

What Authors Can Do

Unfortunately, this is not the first time that a publisher has acted unilaterally to make its ebooks less accessible to the detriment of readers and authors. Trade publisher MacMillan at one point announced it would employ a two-week embargo before libraries could acquire newly published titles as ebooks. Similarly, rising ebook prices during the pandemic hurt many students who relied on these works to learn. Yet, as Wiley’s response to the outcry following its announcement shows, a concerted campaign to pressure these publishers can have results. For example, MacMillan ultimately abandoned its plans for an ebook embargo following a boycott of all its ebook titles by various library systems. 

Most authors have little say in how publishers distribute their works. Publishing contracts typically give publishers broad discretion to determine when, how, and on what terms authors’ books are sold. While it is understandable that authors will not be involved in every decision about distribution, authors have placed trust in publishers that they will make reasonable decisions. So, what can authors do? 

First, as the Wiley ebook situation has shown, authors’ voices do matter. If you have concerns about your book being available to libraries, speak out! One reason that Authors Alliance exists is to help amplify your voice and help publishers understand your views on how their legal and policy decisions affect your interests in making your books available to the world.  If you’re wondering about how we might help, please get in touch—we’d love to hear from you. Second, authors do have an opportunity to influence how their books are shared when negotiating their publishing contracts. There are no guarantees that a publisher will accept your proposed contract language (and we suspect most will be resistant). But given that several publishers have recently demonstrated their unwillingness to make reasonable distribution decisions, it seems to us equally reasonable to ask for contractual assurances that they will continue to sell your book to libraries on reasonable terms, in all formats. For some language to serve as a starting point, #ebooksos has shared their model contract language for authors, here.

Authors for Libraries

Posted September 29, 2022
Photo by Patrick Fore on Unsplash

Last month in our newsletter to members (join here so you don’t miss future news!), we shared a call to sign on to an open letter, organized by Fight for the Future, on behalf of authors in support of libraries. We’re really pleased to announce that this letter is now posted online and open for more signatures here. We encourage you to read it and sign if you support its message.

We’ve written quite a bit recently about the challenges libraries face today – from the lawsuit filed against the Internet Archive over controlled digital lending, to efforts to restrict libraries from preserving and lending ebooks. Just this week we saw one publisher, John Wiley & Sons, unilaterally yank 1,379 educational titles from library ebook collections (as far as we can tell, with no author input), refusing to sell electronic copies to libraries and forcing teachers and students to scramble for access just as the academic term begins.

From our perspective, libraries are critically important partners in making sure that authors’ works are read and preserved. As the letter explains, “Libraries are a fundamental collective good.” The letter’s signatories “are disheartened by the recent attacks against libraries being made in our name by trade associations such as the Association of American Publishers and the Publishers Association: undermining the traditional rights of libraries to own and preserve books, intimidating libraries with lawsuits, and smearing librarians.” 

Unfortunately, and predictably, the letter has received almost instant condemnation from the Authors Guild, the AAP (which, you might recall, has asserted that it has acted as legal counsel for the publishers who brought the Hachette v. Internet Archive lawsuit), and other related groups. They assert: 1) that authors don’t really understand what the Internet Archive controlled digital lending lawsuit is about, and if they did they wouldn’t support it,  and 2) that “real libraries” don’t engage in activities like the controlled digital lending that is the subject of the Internet Archive lawsuit. 

Neither argument holds weight. As part of our own efforts to support controlled digital lending in this case, Authors Alliance conducted a survey of our members and other authors. Responses showed that many authors do support CDL, and support it strongly. Additionally, many libraries across the country practice CDL: it is far from a practice unique to the Internet Archive.

The RAP Act: Protecting Creative Expression in Court 

Posted September 14, 2022
Rap on Trial: A Legal Guide for Attorneys

One of Authors Alliance’s long standing goals is to support authors’ freedom of expression. As we’ve recently highlighted, sometimes challenges to those rights come from unusual sources in the law. 

This week we caught up with Jack Lerner, Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Intellectual Property, Arts, and Technology Clinic at UC Irvine Law. Jack is the co-author, with Professor Charis Kubrin, of Rap on Trial: A Legal Guide for Attorneys, a resource which aims to address an alarming trend of prosecutors and courts treating rap lyrics not as a creative and artistic endeavor, but as confessions of illegal behavior and evidence of knowledge, motive, or identity with respect to an alleged crime. As his co-author Charis Kubrin explains, “putting rap on trial has significant implications for how we define creative expression as well as for free speech and the right of all Americans to receive a fair trial.”

Jack’s work and that of several aligned groups has now resulted in three pieces of proposed legislation–one federal bill called the “Restoring Artistic Protection Act” (RAP Act), and two similar bills at the state level in New York and California–that would amend the rules of evidence to make it more difficult for prosecutors to introduce a defendant’s creative or artistic expression as evidence against a defendant in a criminal case. Authors Alliance supports these efforts. The California bill is now sitting on Governor Newsom’s desk, and we have written a letter to the Governor explaining why this legislation is important not just to rap artists, but to all authors and creators, and expressing our hope that it becomes law. Governor Newsom has until September 30th to sign or veto the bill. If he neither signs nor vetoes it, the bill will become law, going into effect in January 2023. 

These bills–while addressing discriminatory use of rap lyrics against defendants–are designed to apply broadly to protect many other creators, including authors, from having their creative expressions used against them in court. The RAP Act, for example, states that as a general matter, ”evidence of a defendant’s creative or artistic expression, whether  original or derivative, is not admissible against such defendant in a criminal case.” It allows for limited exceptions, such as when the lyrics make a specific reference to the alleged crime, but nonetheless provides strong protections for creative expression. The Act goes on to define “creative or artistic expression” broadly, as “the expression or application of creativity or imagination in the production or arrangement of forms, sounds, words, movements or symbols, including music, dance, performance art, visual art, poetry, literature, film, and other such objects or media.’’

We recently had the opportunity to sit down with Jack and discuss with him the background, and future, of this legislation: 

Tell me about what motivated this effort? 

Jack: The issues motivating the RAP Act have been going on for a long time. While it’s almost unthinkable that someone would use the music of Johnny Cash (“I shot a man in Reno just to watch him die”) or Eric Clapton (who sang “I Shot the Sheriff,” covering Bob Marley) as evidence against them in a trial, rap lyrics have been used again and again against rappers. Conservatively, scholars have identified over 500 cases in which prosecutors have used rap lyrics as evidence against an artist in court.

The admission of rap lyrics can be extremely detrimental to defendants. Over 25 years of research has shown that the mere association with rap can create a strong negative bias in jurors, who will take the lyrics as more literal, more violent, and more threatening, as compared to lyrics from other genres. All you have to do is label it “rap.” 

Can you tell me about the origins of these bills? 

The work on this issue began almost a decade ago. Charis Kubrin, who co-authored the Rap on Trial Legal Guide, Charis Kubrin, has been writing about this issue since 2005, and has since conducted astonishing research demonstrating a massive risk of bias when rap lyrics are introduced. When she began to hear regularly from defense attorneys needing help with this issue, we conceived of developing the Guide. Over three years later, with the help of dozens of law students in the IP, Arts, and Tech Clinic at UCI Law, we published the Guide along with a Brief Bank and Case Compendium. 

What has been remarkable is that as we surfaced these issues, lawmakers in New York and California found out about them on their own and took action. And proponents from both the entertainment industry and the criminal justice movement have been working with them. The New York bill became the basis for the current federal bill, and the California bill is now on Governor Newsom’s desk for his signature. 

How do these bills actually work? 

These bills raise the bar for introducing rap lyrics as evidence. The federal bill, for example, would require a prosecutor to establish by “clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant intended the lyrics to have a literal meaning or that the expression refers to the “the specific facts of the crime alleged.”

The California bill is a little bit different. It says that the court should start with the presumption that creative expression is not probative, and requires that prosecutors have to overcome that presumption by showing that the lyrics in question meet a set of criteria for introduction as evidence, such as that they match the specific elements of the crime, or were written close in time to the alleged crime. Notably, the court is required to look at whether the introduction will introduce bias, and must look at all the research I mentioned on the issue of negative bias associated with rap. 

How do these bills affect other creators? 

These bills apply broadly, protecting artists, authors and all other types of creators. All the cases we’ve identified in our research have been focused on the uniquely negative use of rap lyrics against defendants–but you can see the importance of these protections for authors and other creators, especially in the current political climate. For example, with book censorship taking hold in a variety of places, it’s easy to imagine an aggressive prosecutor trying to use a controversial author’s fiction writing as evidence of criminal activity.  

What can authors do? 

The federal RAP Act has been co-sponsored by representatives Bowman (NY), Johnson (GA), Maloney (NY), and Jayapal (WA). If you support the bill, you should contact your representative expressing your support. 


If you are in California, AB 2799 is currently on Governor Newsom’s desk awaiting his signature to become law. You can contact his office to express your support and encourage him to sign the bill.

Update: Authors Alliance Opposes the Revised Journalism Competition and Preservation Act

Posted September 6, 2022
Photo by Colin Lloyd on Unsplash

Today, Authors Alliance joined 20 public interest, civil society, and other like-minded organizations in signing on to a letter opposing the latest iteration of the Journalism Competition and Preservation Act (“JCPA”). The full text of the letter can be found here. Last year, Authors Alliance signed on to an earlier letter voicing opposition to the JCPA when it was initially proposed. A new version of the bill was recently released in the Senate, prompting the bill’s opponents to reiterate our concerns. 

In brief, the JCPA would enable collective bargaining by news organizations with large online platforms by creating a “safe harbor” from antitrust law to allow media organizations to band together and negotiate with these platforms. This blog post will explain our concerns about the bill and provide an update on how the legislation has evolved in the months since it was first proposed. 

Problems with the JCPA

Touted as bipartisan legislation intended to protect journalism from unfair encroachment by large tech companies, the legislation has received support from groups such as the Authors Guild and some news publications. But civil society organizations have drawn attention to serious problems with the legislation for those who care about robust fair use rights and access to knowledge. 

The JCPA would force platforms to negotiate with news publications for “access” to their content to engage in basic activities such as linking to the news publication’s website. By creating what some have dubbed a “link tax,” the JCPA could lead organizations and individuals to link less to other sources out of fear of copyright liability, creating a chilling effect on online speech and making knowledge less accessible. The JCPA could also expand the scope of copyright by covering the aggregation of snippets or headlines from press publications—information that is in many cases not entitled to copyright protection. The JCPA may also work to entrench the largest press publishers while disadvantaging smaller publishers, who lack the sophistication or resources to participate in this collective bargaining. 

Changes to Legislative Language

The latest revised bill represents the third round of revisions to the JCPA (Public Knowledge has published comprehensive discussions of the first and second rounds of revisions in recent months for readers interested in learning more). Unfortunately, the latest changes to the JCPA does little to address the concerns voiced by Authors Alliance and our co-signatories last year. 

There is some evidence that the bill’s sponsors heard the concerns voiced by Authors Alliance and others, but the changes do not go nearly far enough towards ameliorating our concerns. For example, the latest version of the bill includes a provision stating that it does modify, expand, or alter the rights guaranteed under copyright. But the legislation could also cover activities that are considered to be fair uses (such as aggregating “snippets” from articles and linking), creating uncertainty as to how the fair use doctrine interacts with this proposed legislation. 

The revised bill also includes an “employee cap” which would bar news organizations with over 1,500 employees from participating in the anticipated collective bargaining to help address concerns about entrenching the largest players. But this would exclude just three of the country’s largest news publications, making it ineffective at addressing monopoly concerns. As today’s letter points out, the legislation as currently envisioned could “cement and stimulate consolidation in the industry and create new barriers to entry for new and innovative models of truly independent, local journalism.”  To make matters worse, the JCPA does nothing to ensure that arbitration that any gains to news organizations will actually go to the journalists actually writing the articles. The legislation establishes “collective bargaining” rights for publications, many of which do not allow their employees to collectively bargain. By prioritizing publications over the authors who make these publications possible, the bill does little to address the difficulties faced by journalists and other authors. 

Finally, other changes in the legislation create new problems. New language in the bill would force  platforms to carry content of digital journalism organizations that participate in collective negotiations, which could lead to platforms being required to aggregate content containing extreme views or misinformation. This raises serious free expression concerns.

Authors Alliance cares deeply about a vibrant and diverse publishing ecosystem where smaller publishers are not disadvantaged, and the legislation as envisioned would do just the opposite.

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 A “brief” update on the Warhol Case – Amicus Briefs and the Solicitor General’s View

Posted August 25, 2022

Grokster Briefs, photo by Wendy Seltzer, CC-BY 2.0, showing amicus briefs from an earlier copyright case before the Supreme Court, MGM v. Grokster

Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith is high stakes, as far as copyright law goes. The fair use case, currently before the Supreme Court, has the potential to radically change how we understand and rely on fair use, so it’s not surprising that the case has generated significant interest. We’ve chronicled the background of the suit and arguments made by the Andy Warhol Foundation (“AWF”) here and by photographer Lynn Goldsmith, here.  

Last week, the final set of amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs were filed. In total, there were 38 amicus briefs filed: 8 in support of the AWF, 20 in support of Goldsmith, and 9 in support of neither party. Our own brief, in support of AWF, is here.

If you add them up, the amicus briefs total around 240,000 words (for context, that’s just a little shorter than A Game of Thrones!). They come from a range of perspectives, with submissions from the “Royal Manticoran Navy: The Official Honor Harrington Fan Association;” Dr. Seuss Enterprises; Senator Marsha Blackburn; individual artists, photographers, photography groups; various media and publishing industry associations; at least 59 law and art professors across a number of different briefs (for, against, and neutral); several library groups and museums; and many others. It’s hard to summarize all of the briefs in a single blog post, but you can read them yourself on the Supreme Court website here. 

The U.S. Government’s amicus brief: making art may be a fair use, but selling it isn’t

One brief stands out: the amicus brief submitted by the United States government. Typically, the government will only file an amicus brief when it has a meaningful federal interest in the case, which it identified here as primarily based on the policy advisory role of the U.S. Copyright Office and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to Congress and the Executive Branch, respectively. Submitted by the Solicitor General and co-authored by a number of U.S. Copyright Office staff, it argues that the Second Circuit rightly decided the case and that Goldsmith should prevail. If nothing else, it’s worth a read to understand how the Copyright Office staff think about fair use. 

The brief largely echoes and bolsters the arguments made by Goldsmith, but reframes a key issue in the case with a new and unusual argument about licensing that we thought worth highlighting. First, the government brief starts by redefining what the case is about, telling the court that the question presented is “whether petitioner established that its licensing of the silkscreen image was a ‘transformative’ use . . . ” (emphasis mine). That is a subtle but important change from how AWF presented the question to the Supreme Court when it decided to hear the case. AWF stated the question as  “whether a work of art is ‘transformative’ when it conveys a different meaning or message from its source material.” Goldsmith, in her brief opposing Supreme Court review, framed the question slightly differently but still focused on the original Warhol prints and not their subsequent licensing. She argued that the question is “whether the Second Circuit correctly held that Warhol’s silkscreens of Prince did not constitute a transformative use.”

The government’s brief then goes on to make the following argument: that “the fair-use inquiry focuses on the specific use—here, petitioner’s 2016 commercial licensing of the Orange Prince image to Condé Nast—that is alleged to be infringing.” 

The first part of that statement is nothing new: fair use is a fact-specific inquiry. What’s interesting is how the government then goes on to narrowly defining the “use” in question as AWF’s subsequent commercial licensing of the work. The government argues that the court should distinguish between the creation of Warhol’s original prints—which may have been a fair use—and the exploitation of the Warhol print via commercial licensing, which the government argues was not. The government isn’t entirely alone in suggesting this approach. For example, a brief by a number of library organizations suggested that the court might focus on the commercial licensing as a way to resolve this case, and a brief by a number of museums discuss some of the implications of this approach.  

The government’s narrow focus on commercial licensing seems like an attempt at a Solomonic resolution for this particular case, and may seem like a good way to achieve a just result for fair use edge cases. But it’s worth pausing to consider some unintended consequences. 

It’s a novel approach—we can’t think of a single case in which a court ruled that the creation of a secondary work was fair, but its subsequent commercial exploitation (such as when a work is licensed to a magazine or publisher) was not.  

This new approach seems likely to create an awful lot of confusion and uncertainty for creators. It would mean that ownership of rights in a secondary work that rely on fair use would be permanently hobbled; instead of the full bundle of rights that copyright provides (such as the rights to distribute, perform, and reproduce the work), the author relying on fair use to create a new work would be stuck with a more tenuous set of rights, since this new work could at any time be converted from a “lawful fair use” with a copyright owned by the author, to an “infringing derivative” based on its crossing an undefined line of too much commercial exploitation.   

This change in status, from lawful to infringing, causes particular uncertainty for creators because of Section 103(a), a part of the copyright act we don’t discuss much. Section 103(a) states that, for a derivative or compilation that incorporates pre-existing copyrighted materials, there is no copyright at all “in any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.” For a work like the Warhol print that is so tightly integrated with the Goldsmith original, Section 103(a) would put the Warhol print into a copyright twilight zone—the Warhol foundation wouldn’t hold any copyright at all, but neither would anyone else. It would effectively give Goldsmith a veto over any subsequent use, though not actually owning rights in the secondary work itself.

This could also generate quite a bit of uncertainty for downstream users who were relying on AWF’s previously valid rights in the secondary work. Imagine, for example, that prior to licensing the Warhol image to Condé Nast, AWF had granted a free license to a number of non-profit libraries, museums, or art history scholars to reproduce and distribute the Warhol image in a variety of educational and scholarly contexts. We presume that this licensing passes fair use muster and so AWF still holds rights. Then, AWF later licenses the Warhol print to Condé Nast and crosses the fair use line. Section 103(a) would then apply to extinguish  all of AWF’s rights that underlie the license for scholarly use, converting previously valid, licensed uses into ones that potentially infringe themselves on Goldsmith’s rights. 

Perhaps those downstream users could then rely on fair use themselves to continue to make use of the prints, but that puts an awful lot of responsibility on those users to understand and apply fair use themselves so that they are sure to stay within the bounds of the law. It also would require those users to somehow learn of the subsequent infringing use and extinguishment of their license. That kind of notification isn’t something the copyright system is currently well-suited to accomplish. It also casts aside those users outside the U.S. who don’t have any such backup fair use pathway to legitimize their use. 

Commerciality and market considerations certainly play an important role in the fair use assessment, and maybe it would have made a difference in this case if Warhol had actually agreed not to commercialize the prints but then later did (there is no evidence of this). But, as it stands, it seems to us that creating a category of secondary copyrighted works that are only sometimes fair use, until they’re not based on subsequent commercial exploitation, isn’t the best option. 

Authors Alliance Submits Amicus Brief in Sicre de Fontbrune v. Wofsy

Posted August 23, 2022
Photo by Arièle Bonte on Unsplash

Yesterday, Authors Alliance submitted an amicus brief in Sicre de Fontbrune v. Wofsy, joined by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, and Public Knowledge. We have been covering this case on our blog over the past few weeks, and are delighted we could share our perspective with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals as it considers whether to grant Wofsy’s request for a rehearing. You can read our full brief below.

Our brief makes two principal arguments for why the Ninth Circuit should re-hear the case. First, we explain that the case has serious First Amendment implications which could affect the free speech rights of countless U.S. authors and members of the public. Next, we argue that the errors the original panel of Ninth Circuit judges made in its fair use analysis are serious enough that the Ninth Circuit should reconsider whether Wofsy has a viable fair use defense to Sicre de Fontbrune’s infringement claim.

In our fair use argument, we drilled down further on the various errors the panel made as well as the serious ramifications its decision could have on authors’ ability to rely on fair use to create new works of authorship. We argue that the panel failed to consider the First Amendment limitations on copyright protection: the photographs in question exhibited minimal creativity, which the court should have considered as part of its analysis of the nature of the works at issue. We also argue that the court erred by disagreeing with the lower court’s finding that Wofsy’s use was aligned with scholarship and research—prototypical examples of fair use set forth in the Copyright Act. Finally, we explain that fair use is a crucial First Amendment safeguard, which the panel should also have given more weight to in its decision. 

Authors Alliance extends our thanks to Kathryn Thornton at Ropes & Gray for providing support on this brief, as well as our fellow amici for their feedback and support. 

Fair Use, the First Amendment, and Foreign Copyright Judgments Part II

Posted August 16, 2022
Photo by Ibrahim Boran on Unsplash

Earlier this month, we wrote about the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Sicre de Fontbrune v. Wofsy—a case about whether U.S. Courts should enforce foreign copyright judgments when the challenged use would likely be a fair use if the case were brought in the United States. 

The good news from Sicre de Fontbrune (at least for U.S. authors) was that the Ninth Circuit seemed to agree that fair use is an important enough matter of public policy to at least deserve further assessment before enforcing a foreign judgment, though it didn’t answer the issue definitively. Although the U.S. is not totally unique in how it approaches fair use, fair use is a distinctive and important part of U.S. public policy, and courts have repeatedly emphasized how it supports core free speech rights as embodied in the First Amendment. So, we think it makes sense that courts should give special attention to fair use and conduct a thorough analysis when U.S. authors have relied on that right. 

But unfortunately, when the Ninth Circuit conducted its own fair use assessment, it gave Wofsy’s fair use assertion anything but special attention, conducting a more cursory analysis than the doctrine requires. We see two grave errors in the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 

So what did the Ninth Circuit get wrong?  

First, some basic facts from the case: Wofsy (the defendant) got permission from the Picasso estate to publish what has now become a standard Picasso reference work, The Picasso ProjectThe Picasso Project documents Picasso’s greatest works and incorporates substantial reference information. Wofsy reused a number of images of Picasso paintings from an earlier, larger work known as the Zervos Catalogue, in which Sicre De Fontbrune bought rights to in the late 1970s. The Zervos Catalogue is a 33-volume work with over 16,000 images of Picasso’s art, produced with cooperation from Picasso and his estate from 1932-1979. The Zervos Catalogue, which does not contain the same reference information as The Picasso Project, is now out of print and selling on the used market for upwards of $20,000 for all 33 volumes. The Picasso Project is 28 volumes, each of which can be purchased individually for $150 directly from Wofsy (or $4,200 for the whole set).

Sicre de Fontbrune originally sued Wofsy in French court in the mid-1990s when he discovered copies of The Picasso Project for sale in a French bookstoreAccording to the Ninth Circuit Court’s retelling of the French case, The Picasso Project reused some 1,400 images from the Zervos Catalogue. The court explained that Sicre de Fontbrune’s claim was not that Wofsy infringed Picasso’s copyrights (remember, he had permission from the Picasso estate), but that Wofsy had infringed Sicre de Fontbrune’s rights in the photographs that it had procured of Picasso’s art and published in the Zervos Catalogue.

The district court, in its own abbreviated fair use analysis, concluded that the use was fair, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. You can read the Ninth Circuit’s fair use reasoning here.

The most significant and concerning error in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is that it didn’t actually evaluate any of the individual photographs in which Sicre de Fontbrune claimed his rights were infringed. The second factor in fair use analysis requires courts to assess the “nature and character” of the underlying photographs. In the words of another Ninth Circuit opinion, the second fair use factor “recognizes that creative works are ‘closer to the core of intended copyright protection’ than informational and functional works, ‘with the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied.’” 

This factor is particularly important in this case because limits on the scope of copyright protection are one of the other ways that copyright law avoids restricting First Amendment protected speech. As the Supreme Court has explained, “First Amendment protections [are] . . . embodied in the Copyright Act’s distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment traditionally afforded by fair use.” Those limits provide breathing room for the public to freely use underlying ideas and concepts in copyrighted works, while preventing others from locking up that underlying expression from further reuse without adding anything creative or new.

In this case, the defendants didn’t argue (and the court didn’t consider) that the photographs may not be protectable under U.S. law, but the court should have considered the creativity of these photographs more thoroughly as part of its fair use assessment. Instead, the panel merely recited the adage that “photos are generally viewed as creative” and then accepted without question the judgment of the French court regarding whether the photographs could be protected by copyright, using French legal standards to judge creativity, that the photos have “creative elements.” There is nothing to suggest that the panel (or the district court) ever even looked at a copy of the pictures.

While it is true that some photographs can be highly original and creative, the photos in this case are mere photographic representations of other works, exhibiting almost no creativity (a “modicum” of which is required for a work to be protected by copyright in the U.S.). Unfortunately, given the sparse briefing on the fair use issue below and lack of argument from the plaintiffs on fair use, the court never had the opportunity to really look into the creativity issue. At a minimum, the Ninth Circuit should have sent this issue back down to the district court for it to make a judgment for itself. If either court had looked at these photos, it seems obvious to us that the minimal creativity they exhibit would have resulted in the second fair use factor strongly favoring Wofsy’s use.  

Picasso’s Pierrot and Harlequin (1918), one of the Zervos images reproduced in The Picasso Project. The image on the left is from the Art Institute of Chicago, which holds the original. The image on the right is from Zervos Catalogue, displaying no meaningful creative addition to Picasso’s original.

The other major mistake the court made was to not meaningfully evaluate the “purpose and character” and transformative nature of Wofsy’s use under the first fair use factor, one of the most important factors in fair use analysis. The Ninth Circuit rejected the lower court’s finding that Wofy’s use “aligned with criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . .  . , scholarship, or research,” and instead construed the use in the most simplistic terms: “The ‘use’ at issue is . . . the reproduction of copyrighted photographs in a book offered for sale.” So, the Ninth Circuit said, the use was both commercial and non-transformative. 

That kind of superficial analysis of the purpose and character of Wofsy’s use is not sufficient in fair use analysis. While it is true that Wofsy copied the photographs for use in a book offered for sale, at that high level of abstraction, virtually any unauthorized use of images in a book offered for sale would fail this version of the factor one analysis. Such an approach would radically alter commonly accepted understandings of how fair use applies to nonfiction publishing and would upend the market, which relies heavily on fair use to incorporate images in “books offered sale.”  

As the Supreme Court recently stated, “in determining whether a use is ‘transformative,’ [a court] must go further and examine the copying’s more specifically described ‘purpose[s]’ and ‘character.” In this case, Wofsy’s purpose in using the images was to create a “systematic and comprehensive illustrated record of Picasso’s paintings,” far more complete than the Zervos Catalogue and with substantial reference information on with substantial cross-reference information to aid scholars in finding other catalogs that include each image, and where each underlying original Picasso may be found. These uses are new and different from the original photographs, enabling scholarship and research, and making them consistent with the Copyright Act’s prototypical examples of fair uses. Had the court interrogated the purpose and character of Wofsy’s use more thoroughly, it would have reached the same conclusion as the district court and found this factor too weighed in favor of fair use. 

What comes next? 

Given the importance of fair use and free speech to U.S. public policy, and these significant errors in the Ninth Circuit’s decision, last week, Wofsy filed a petition with the Ninth Circuit for rehearing and rehearing en banc. Authors Alliance intends to submit a brief supporting their petition, which we hope will help the court address these errors.