Tag Archives: antitrust

Updates on AI Copyright Law and Policy: Section 1202 of the DMCA, Doe v. Github, and the UK Copyright and AI Consultation

Posted March 7, 2025

some district courts have applied DMCA 1202(b) to physical copies, including textile, which means if you cut off parts of a fabric that contain copyright information, you could be liable for up to $25,000 in damages

The US Copyright Act has never been praised for its clarity or its intuitive simplicity—at a whopping 460 pages long, it is filled with hotly debated ambiguities and overly complex provisions. The copyright laws of most other jurisdictions aren’t much better.

Because of this complexity of copyright law, the implications of changes to copyright law and policy are not always clear to most authors. As we’ve said in the past, many of these issues seem arcane, and largely escape public attention. Yet entities with a vested interest in maximalist copyright—often at odds with the public interest—are certainly paying attention, and often claim to speak for all authors when they in fact represent only a small subset. As part of our efforts to advocate for a future where copyright law offers ample clarity, certainty, and real focus on values such as the advancement of knowledge and free expression, we would like to share with you two recent projects we undertook:

The 1202 Issue Brief and Amicus Brief in Doe v. Github

Authors Alliance has been closely monitoring the impact of Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Section 1202. As we have explained in a previous post, Section 1202(b) creates liability for those who remove or alter copyright management information (CMI) or distribute works with removed CMI. This provision, originally intended to prevent wide-spread piracy, has been increasingly invoked in AI copyright lawsuits, raising significant concerns for lawful use of copyrighted materials beyond training AI. While on its face, penalties for removing CMI might seem somewhat reasonable, the scope of CMI (including a wide variety of information such as website terms of service, affiliate links, and other information) combined with the challenge of including it with all downstream distribution of incomplete copies (imagine if you had to replicate and distribute something like the Amazon Kindle terms of service every time you quoted text from an ebook) could be potentially very disruptive for many users.

In order to address the confusion regarding the (somewhat inaptly named) “identicality requirement” by the courts in the 9th Circuit, we have released an issue brief, as well undertaken to file an amicus brief in the Doe v. Github case now pending in the 9th Circuit.

Here are the key reasons why we care—and why you should care—about this seemingly obscure issue:

The Precedential Nature of Doe v. Github: The upcoming 9th Circuit case, Doe v. GitHub, will address whether Section 1202(b) should only apply when copies made or distributed are identical (or nearly identical) to the original. Lower courts have upheld this identicality requirement to prevent overbroad applications of the law, and the appellate ruling may set a crucial precedent for AI and fair use.
Potential Impact on Otherwise Legal Uses: It is not entirely certain if fair use is a defense to 1202(b) claims. If the identicality requirement is removed, Section 1202(b) could create liability for transformative fair uses, snippet reuse, text and data mining, and other lawful applications. This would introduce uncertainty for authors, researchers, and educators who rely on copyrighted materials in limited, legal ways. We advocate for maintaining the identicality requirement and clarifying that fair use applies as a defense to Section 1202 claims.
Possibility of Frivolous Litigation: Section 1202(b) claims have surged in recent years, particularly in AI-related lawsuits. The statute’s vague language and broad applicability have raised fears that opportunistic litigants could use it to chill innovation, scholarship, and creative expression.

To find out more about what’s at stake, please take a look at our 1202(b) Issue Brief. You are also invited to share your stories with us, on how you have navigated this strange statute.

Reply to the UK Open Consultation on Copyright and AI

We have members in the UK, and many of our US-based members publish in the UK. We have been watching the development in UK copyright law closely, and have recently filed a comment to the UK Open Consultation on Copyright and AI. In our comment, we emphasized the importance of ensuring that copyright policy serves the public interest. Our response’s key points include:

Competition Concerns: We alerted the policy-makers that their top objective must include preventing monopolies forming in the AI space. If licensing for AI training becomes the norm, we foresee power consolidating in a handful of tech companies and their unbridled monopoly permeating all aspects of our lives within a few decades—if not sooner.
Fair Use as a Guiding Principle: We strongly believe that the use of works in the training and development of AI models constitutes fair use under US law. While this issue is currently being tested in courts, case law suggests that fair use will prevail, ensuring that AI training on copyrighted works remains permissible. The UK does not have an identical fair use statute, but has recognized that some of its functions—such as flexibility to permit new technological uses—are valuable. We argue that the wise approach is for the UK to update its laws to ensure its creative and tech sectors can meaningfully participate in the global arena. Our comment called for a broad AI and TDM exception allowing temporary copies of copyrighted works for AI training. We emphasized that when AI models extract uncopyrightable elements, such as facts and ideas, this should remain lawful and protected.
Noncommercial Research Should Be Protected: We strongly advocated for the protection of noncommercial AI research, arguing that academic institutions and their researchers should not face legal barriers when using copyrighted works to train AI models for research purposes. Imposing additional licensing requirements would place undue burdens on academic institutions, which already pay significant fees to access research materials.

Independent Publisher’s Lawsuit Against Audible Fails, Highlighting Challenges to Receive Fair Streaming Compensation

Posted February 21, 2025

Last November, we covered a case where a group of authors complained about McGraw Hill’s interpretation of publishing agreements related to compensation for ebooks. As subscription-based models become increasingly dominant in the publishing industry, authors must be vigilant about how their contracts define compensation. Platforms like Kindle Unlimited, Audible, and academic ebook services are reshaping traditional royalty structures. This is not just a concern for trade books; academic publishing is also shifting towards subscription-based access, as evidenced by ProQuest’s recent announcement that it is ending print sales and moving toward a “Netflix for books” model.

Here we see yet another case where ambiguous contractual terms resulted in financial loss for an author—

On Feb. 19th, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of Teri Woods Publishing’s copyright infringement and breach-of-contract claims against Audible and other audiobook distributors in Teri Woods Publ’g, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc. The Plaintiff initially granted the rights (that are the subject of this dispute) to Urban Audios in a licensing agreement. Thereafter, Urban Audio granted the rights under that agreement to Blackstone, which then sublicensed its rights to Amazon and Audible.

The Plaintiff in this case, Teri Woods Publishing, is an independent publisher founded by urban fiction author Teri Woods. The Plaintiff argued—and the courts ultimately disagreed—that the licensing agreement did not unambiguously permit Defendants to distribute Teri Woods’ audiobooks through the Defendants’ online audiobook streaming subscription services. More specifically, on the question of compensation for online streaming, Plaintiff and Defendants disagreed on whether (1) online streaming counted as “internet downloads” or alternatively “other contrivances, appliances, mediums and means,” and (2) the licensing terms dealing with royalties prohibit subscription streaming.

The licensing terms in question are contained in the licensing agreement Plaintiff entered into in 2018, granting Urban Audios the

“exclusive unabridged audio publishing rights, to manufacture, market, sell and distribute copies throughout the World, and in all markets, copies of unabridged readings of the [Licensed Works] on cassette, CD, MP3-CD, pre-loaded devices, as Internet downloads and on, and in, other contrivances, appliances, mediums and means (now known and hereafter developed) which are capable of emitting sounds derived for the recording of audiobooks.”

In exchange of this assignment of rights, Urban Audio—as the Licensee—must pay Plaintiff:

“(a) Ten percent (10%) of Licensee’s net receipts from catalog, wholesale and other retail sales and rentals of the audio recordings of said literary work;

(b) Twenty Five percent (25%) of net receipts on all internet downloads of said literary work.

In case you are not familiar with the services Amazon Audible provides: members of Audible generally pay a monthly fee to digitally stream or download audiobooks, instead of making any specific payment for the specific audiobooks they are streaming or downloading. This method of distribution, the Plaintiff argues, led to drastically lower compensation than expected, as the audiobooks were made available to subscribers at a fraction of their retail price.

Audible has a history of relying on ambiguous contractual terms to reduce author payouts. The “Audiblegate” controversy, for instance, exposed how Audible’s return policy allowed listeners to return audiobooks after extensive use, deducting royalties from authors without transparency. That practice came under legal scrutiny inn Golden Unicorn Enters. v. Audible Inc., where authors alleged that Audible deliberately structured its payment model to significantly reduce their earnings (unfortunately, the court in that case also largely sided with Audible)

Despite Audible’s track record, the courts were unsympathetic to Plaintiff’s grievance in the Teri Woods case, and held that the plain meaning of the phrase “other contrivances, appliances, mediums and means (now known and hereafter developed)” in the licensing agreement included digital streams and other future technological developments in distribution services. The courts also observed that the underlying licensing agreement did not provide for the payment of royalties on a per-unit basis; Plaintiff was only entitled to a percentage of “net receipts” received by Urban Audio for sales, rentals, and internet downloads.

The ambiguity in defining what constitutes an “internet download,” and whether payment was due on a per unit basis, ultimately were interpreted in favor of Audible. This case serves to remind us again of the importance of adopting clear contractual language.

Licensing agreements should be drafted with clear and precise language regarding revenue models and payment structures. Subscription-based compensation models, like those employed by Audible, fundamentally differ from traditional sales models, often leading to lower per-unit earnings for authors. By failing to anticipate and address these nuances, authors risk losing control over how their works are monetized. Ensuring that rights, distribution methods, and payment structures are clearly defined can prevent disputes and financial losses down the line.

Many authors assume that digital rights are similar to traditional print rights, but as this case demonstrates, vague phrasing can allow distributors to exploit gaps in understanding. If authors do not explicitly outline limitations on emerging distribution technologies, they may find themselves receiving significantly less compensation than they anticipate when signing the agreement. For example, authors should ensure their contracts specify whether subscription-based revenue falls under traditional royalty calculations, and whether distribution via new technological formats require renegotiation. Beyond the issues with ambiguous contractual terms, this case also highlights the broader issue of how digital platforms can negatively impact readers and authors alike. Readers no longer own the books they purchase; instead, they receive licensed access that can be revoked or restricted at any time. This shift undermines the traditional relationship between books and their readers. Authors are equally threatened by these digital intermediaries, who have the power to dictate distribution methods and unilaterally alter revenue models; an author’s right to fair compensation is too often sacrificed along the way. The situation is especially dire with audiobooks, where Audible dominates the market.

Antitrust Lawsuit Filed Against Large Academic Publishers

Posted September 17, 2024

On September 12, a San Francisco-based law firm filed an antitrust lawsuit on behalf of UCLA professor Lucina Uddin against six prominent academic publishers and the trade association that represents them: Elsevier, John Wiley & Sons, Sage Publications, Springer Nature, Taylor & Francis, Wolters Kluwer, and the International Association of Scientific, Technical, and Medical Publishers (“STM”). The suit is brought on behalf of a class that it defines as “All natural persons residing in the United States who performed peer review services for, or submitted a manuscript for publication to, any of the Publisher Defendants’ peer-reviewed journals from September 12, 2020 to the present.” The complaint lists just one claim for relief: that “Publisher Defendants and their co-conspirators entered into and engaged in unlawful agreements in restraint of the trade and commerce described above in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.”

To support this claim, the plaintiff makes three key allegations. Namely, that the publishers have illegally agreed amongst each other to abide by:

a “Single Submission Rule,” where researchers are only allowed to submit a manuscript to one journal for consideration unless the journal rejects it;
a “Unpaid Peer Review Rule,” where journals implement policies to not compensate peer reviewers for their labor; and
a “Gag Rule,” where researchers are not allowed to share or discuss their manuscript once they have submitted it to a journal for consideration before the journal publishes it.

Why would any of these actions constitute an antitrust violation? We thought a little background could be helpful:

To understand this lawsuit, we must first consider the purpose of U.S. antitrust law. The fundamental goal of antitrust law is to encourage competition and ultimately to promote consumer welfare. The Supreme Court explains that: “Congress designed the Sherman Act as a consumer welfare prescription.”

Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act does this by prohibiting “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” This generally requires proving two things: (1) some sort of agreement or business arrangement, and (2) that this agreement is “in restraint of trade,” i.e., unreasonably harmful to competition.

Proving an agreement can sometimes be a complicated factual question, though often there are good clues, especially when joint activity is coordinated through a trade association (antitrust lawyers love to quote Adam Smith on trade associations: “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”) In this case, the plaintiff says that the agreements are so obvious that they are in fact published openly in several portions of the STM’s “International Ethical Principles for Scholarly Publication” which are then implemented and enforced by each publisher.

Proving the second part, that the agreement is in restraint of trade or unreasonably harmful to competition can be more complicated. The courts have developed three different analytical frameworks for evaluating whether conduct harms competition in this context:

A “per se” rule for agreements that are “nakedly” anticompetitive. Examples include agreements to fix prices (what’s alleged here, at least with respect to payment for peer review), bid-rigging, agreements to divide markets, and a few other kinds of less common agreements.
A “rule of reason” test—which applies in most cases—that weighs the pro-competitive effects of the agreement against anti-competitive effects and prohibits agreements only when the anti-competitive harms outweigh the benefits.
“Intermediate” or “quick-look” scrutiny, which covers a small number of cases in which agreements look suspicious on their face but are not so obviously anticompetitive as to fall under the “per se” rule.

The plaintiff’s complaint claims that the publishers’ agreements violate the Sherman Act regardless of which of these three tests apply. But often, some of the most significant battles in antitrust lawsuits are about which of these standards apply since the costs associated with litigating a suit can change dramatically depending on which is used. If the court accepts that the “per se” standard applies, the plaintiff likely wins. If the “quick-look” rule applies, the burden is on the defendant to show that its conduct is not anticompetitive. But if the “rule of reason” standard applies, the suit will likely involve extensive discovery, expert witnesses, and other factual evidence about what exactly the market is, whether the defendants had sufficient market power to negatively affect competition, and whether the agreement would negatively or positively affect competition.

In these cases, defining the relevant market is often crucial. In most antitrust cases, defining the relevant market involves identifying substitutes for the product under review. On this point, the plaintiff argues:

“Publication by peer-reviewed journals is a relevant antitrust market. For scholars who seek to communicate their scientific research, there is no adequate substitute for publication in a peer-reviewed journal. Peer-reviewed journals establish the validity of scientific research through the peer review process, communicate that research to the scientific community, and avoid competing claims to the same scientific discovery.”

For market definition, it is important to include only close substitutes and exclude those that are distant. For academic publishing, even though there are many ways authors can share their manuscripts—from emailing their colleagues, to posting on their personal websites, to publishing with upstart new journals—the fact remains that the journals in question are the primary means of dissemination and are the most heavily read and heavily cited. So at first glance, the complaint seems realistic in its formulation of the market at issue.

The complaint then goes on to argue that the publishers hold significant power in this market and misuse that power, touching on familiar themes such as how these academic publishers extract significant profits, charge high rates for access and increasingly high fees for authors to publish openly, and so on. The plaintiffs allege that this market power has allowed the publishers to make agreements amongst each other (the three allegations noted above) in ways that allow them to maximize profits while also maintaining their market power. We note that it’s true that there may be some other explanations for these practices—in fact, some authors may be proponents of some of them, for example, the single-submission rule. But even if there are other explanations for these rules, with the current arrangement agreed through STM, the allegation is that no member publisher will even try to compete or develop other approaches that may drive up the price for peer reviewers, compete for placement of papers, etc.

How this lawsuit will turn out is hard to predict. This lawsuit flags some very problematic practices enforced on the academic publishing industry by prominent publishers. But there are many other problems with the academic publishing industry not discussed in the complaint. We’ve long thought that the public-interest nature of academic research and publishing is complicated when paired with commercial publishers who have strong incentives to maximize profits. Of course, even for-profit firms are expected to operate within the law; profit-maximizing to the point of adopting anti-competitive practices is fundamentally at odds with their essential social responsibilities.